Efficiency in Lung Transplant Allocation Strategies by Zou, Jingjing
Efficiency in Lung Transplant Allocation Strategies
Jingjing Zou
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy







Efficiency in Lung Transplant Allocation Strategies
Jingjing Zou
Currently in the United States, lungs are allocated to transplant candidates based on the
Lung Allocation Score (LAS). The LAS is an empirically derived score aimed at increasing
total life span pre- and post-transplantation, for patients on lung transplant waiting lists.
The goal here is to develop efficient allocation strategies in the context of lung transplanta-
tion.
In this study, patient and organ arrivals to the waiting list are modeled as independent
homogeneous Poisson processes. Patients’ health status prior to allocations are modeled
as evolving according to independent and identically distributed finite-state inhomogeneous
Markov processes, in which death is treated as an absorbing state. The expected post-
transplantation residual life is modeled as depending on time on the waiting list and on
current health status. For allocation strategies satisfying certain minimal fairness require-
ments, the long-term limit of expected average total life exists, and is used as the standard
for comparing allocation strategies.
Via the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, upper bounds as a function of the ratio of
organ arrival rate to the patient arrival rate for the long-term expected average total life
are derived, and corresponding to each upper bound is an allocable set of (state, time) pairs
at which patients would be optimally transplanted. As availability of organs increases, the
allocable set expands monotonically, and ranking members of the waiting list according to
the availability at which they enter the allocable set provides an allocation strategy that
leads to long-term expected average total life close to the upper bound.
Simulation studies are conducted with model parameters estimated from national lung
transplantation data from United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Results suggest that
compared to the LAS, the proposed allocation strategy could provide a 7% increase in
average total life.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Lung transplantation is the preferred treatment, and sometimes the only possible treatment,
in severe lung disease. There are not enough organs available to meet the need for trans-
plantation, however, so patients with lung diseases are placed on waiting lists. Allocation
rules are used to determine which patient on a waiting list receives a transplantation when
a lung becomes available. Given a standard for comparing different allocation rules, and
given a model for the waiting list process, a question arises: what allocation rule is optimal?
1.1 Waiting Lists for Organ Transplantation
This section provides an overview of issues that arise in the modeling of waiting lists in organ
transplantation generally. In subsequent sections, the exposition will focus more narrowly
on lung transplantation waiting lists and the particular family of models that is the focus
here.
A waiting list for organ transplantation consists of patients added at random calendar
times. Patients arrive with different characteristics such as diagnosis, demographic char-
acteristics, and health status indicators. Patients’ characteristics may change during their
sojourn on the waiting list, and their hazards for death and expected residual life after trans-
plantation may depend on their health characteristics, and thus may also change during their
sojourns.
Organs, either from deceased or living donors, also become available at random calendar
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times. Whenever an organ becomes available, a patient in the waiting list is selected for
transplantation. The selected patient can refuse, in which case another patient in turn is
selected for transplantation, and so on, until a patient accepts an offer. Due to the short
time between when an organ from a deceased donor becomes available and when the organ is
no longer viable for transplantation, available organs from deceased donors are transplanted
almost instantly. An organ recipient’s health characteristics at the time of transplantation
and the recipient’s compatibility with the organ influence the expected post-transplantation
residual life (UNOS [2011]). Candidates who are not transplanted will remain in the waiting
list for future transplantation opportunities. Except in rare circumstances, patients leave
the waiting list only in case of transplantation or death.
In living-donor transplantation, there is also a possibility for organ exchange. Patient-
donor pairs exchange organs in a chain so that patients and donors can receive and donate
compatible organs.
Allocation rules are used to determine which patient in the current waiting list is se-
lected for transplantation when an organ is available. Allocation rules may make use of any
information about the current state or history of the patients in the waiting list.
1.2 Standards for Comparing Allocation Rules
Some standards for comparing allocation rules that have been considered may be char-
acterized in terms of expectations. Examples include patients’ total life expectancy (in-
waiting-list life expectancy plus post-transplantation life expectancy among patients receiv-
ing a transplantation), the in-waiting-list or the post-transplantation life expectancy alone,
quality-adjusted life expectancy (Zenios et al. [2000], Su and Zenios [2006], Alagoz et al.
[2004], Alagoz et al. [2004, 2007a,b], Akan et al. [2012]), patients’ probability of in-waiting-
list deaths (Akan et al. [2012]), expected graft survival rate (Ahn and Hornberger [1996],
Hornberger and Ahn [1997], Su and Zenios [2004, 2005]), the expected number of discarded
organs and average number of matches (Su and Zenios [2004, 2005], Roth et al. [2004, 2005],
Ashlagi et al. [2011, 2012]). Equity standards, which in some cases cannot be expressed in
terms of expectations, have also been considered (Zenios et al. [2000]). An example of an
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allocation rule chosen to serve an equity standard is the first-come-first-serve rule.
There are ethical issues to be considered. Allocation rules that are not consistent over
time or that are affected by factors other than waiting times and relevant health character-
istics of patients might be viewed as inequitable. Relevant health characteristics are those
that predict factors relevant to the standard by which allocation rules are compared, fac-
tors such as the current and future hazards for death and/or post-transplantation survival.
Fair allocations should depend on waiting times and health characteristics of the patients
in the waiting list at the time of organ arrivals and possible independent randomizations.
An example of a fair allocation rule is the first-come-first-served rule. A class of fair allo-
cation rules is obtained by defining an index as a function of a patient’s waiting time and
relevant characteristics and allocating to the patient in the list with the highest index value
(or randomly among patients tied for the highest value).
Defining a standard for comparing allocation rules in terms of an expectation, for exam-
ple, defining a standard in terms of expected total life, does not unambiguously define an
optimization problem. Such a definition begs the question of which patients’ expectations
are to be maximized. Fortunately, as will be seen, with rather minimal assumptions on the
nature of patient and organ arrivals, with allocation rules satisfying a fairness requirement,
waiting list distributions converge, and thus it is natural to take the standard to be the
limit, as the time of operation of the waiting list increases, of the average life for patients
entering the waiting list.
Thus, in order to compare allocation rules, the limiting distribution of the waiting list
needs to be understood. The limiting distribution depends on the following: the probabilistic
properties of patients’ arrivals and initial conditions and organs’ arrivals, the probabilistic
properties of patients’ health characteristics trajectories, the relationship between health
characteristics and the risk of death and expected post-transplantation survival, recipient-
donor compatibility, the probabilistic behavior of patients’ choices of whether to accept
organs when offered, and the difference between living-donor and cadaveric organ trans-
plantation in organ exchanges.
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1.3 Previous Studies on Optimal Organ Allocation
Relevant early studies focused on modeling general resource allocation problems and solving
for optimal allocation rules under given standards. Derman et al. [1971], Albright and
Derman [1972], Derman et al. [1975], developed optimal solutions to a sequential assignment
problem, in which candidates received resources that arrived sequentially at regular intervals.
Ruth et al. [1985] constructed a simulation model to assess the impact of changes in the
number of available cadaveric kidneys on the number of candidates in the waiting list.
Righter [1989] solved a continuous-time resource allocation problem in which finite number
of independent activities following independent Markov processes were to be allocated to
resources that arrived at random times. David and Yechiali [1985, 1990, 1995] and David
[1995] found optimal solutions to maximize total rewards in several sequential matching
problems, in which a finite amount of offers with random rewards arrived in continuous-time
and were to be assigned to a finite number of candidates characterized by different attributes.
Ahn and Hornberger [1996] and Hornberger and Ahn [1997] designed procedures for deciding
individual patient’s eligibility for living-donor kidney transplantation and evaluated whether
incorporating patient preferences could improve patients’ life expectancy.
In recent studies, researchers have modeled the organ transplantation problem with in-
creased complexity in order to reflect aspects of the problem such as those discussed in the
previous section. Moreover, with increased availability of clinical data, simulation studies
have been conducted with parameters estimated from real transplantation data to com-
pare life outcomes with different allocation rules. Zenios [1999], Zenios et al. [1999] and
Zenios et al. [2000] modeled the waiting list for kidney transplantation with a deterministic
continuous-time fluid model, in which patients and organ donors were categorized based
on their demographic, immunological, and physiological characteristics. An optimal allo-
cation rule was derived under the standard of a linear combination of quality-adjusted life
expectancy and two measures of inequity: the likelihood of transplantation of various types
of patients and the difference in mean waiting time across patient types. Su and Zenios
[2004, 2005, 2006] studied the effect of patient choice on kidney transplantation with a se-
quential assignment model, where a finite number of patients were to be allocated a finite
number of kidneys that arrived sequentially in discrete time. Alagoz et al. [2004] modeled
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the health status of individual patients waiting for living-donor liver transplantation as a
discrete time Markov chain with ordered states and stationary transition probabilities, and
found optimal decisions of whether to accept a transplantation offer from a single patient’s
perspective under discounted rewards. Under similar model settings, Alagoz et al. [2007a,b]
studied optimal patient strategies for accepting or rejecting offers of cadaveric and living-
donor livers. Akan et al. [2012] modeled the candidate waiting list for donated livers with a
multi-class fluid model with possible improvements or deteriorations in patient health sta-
tus, and derived optimal allocation strategies under a standard combining expected total
number of in-waiting-list deaths and expected total quality-adjusted years of life.
Other aspects of the organ transplantation problem have also been studied. Roth et al.
[2004, 2005], Ashlagi et al. [2011, 2012] studied the efficiency and benefit of kidney exchange
programs by examining theoretical properties of exchange chains under different assump-
tions. Cechlárová and Lacko [2012] evaluated the computational difficulty in finding donors
in exchange chains. Bertsimas et al. [2013] developed a data-driven method for design-
ing national policies for the allocation of deceased-donor kidneys based on weighted score
components, such as waiting time, specific patient health characteristics, and tissue match-
ing, to approximately maximize life-year gains subject to any set of standards and fairness
constraints choosen by the policy maker.
In one of the few studies on lung transplantation, Vock et al. [2013] evaluated the sur-
vival benefit of lung transplantation with the LAS rule from a causal inference perspective.
They modeled candidates for lung transplantation with changing health states as indepen-
dent subjects, and represented the effect of lung transplantation on patients’ residual life by
the difference between distributions of patients’ counterfactual residual life, with or without
transplantation. The benefit of lung transplantation under the LAS was estimated with
a G-estimator, in which each subject’s probability of receiving a transplantation when an
organ was available was modeled. The G-estimator was selected to reflect that the alloca-
tion assignment was not independent across patients as a result of the competitions among
patients for limited organs.
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1.4 Modeling Issues for Lung Transplantation Waiting Lists
Relative to the richness of the literature on kidney and liver transplantation, few attempts
have been made to model the waiting list for lung transplantation. Several characteristics
distinguish lung transplantation from the transplantation of other organs, however, and
models for waiting lists for kidney and liver transplantation cannot be appropriated wholesale
in the service of designing allocation rules for lung transplantation. In this section, the
discussion focuses more narrowly on issues specific to lung transplantation.
In contrast to the case of kidney and liver transplantation, living donor transplantation
is extremely rare in lung transplantation: according to UNOS [2011], 8,674 patients were
in the waiting list from year 2009 to 2011, 5,172 received deceased-donor transplant and
only two received living donor transplant (reasons for the rare occurrences of living-donor
transplantations include concerns about donor complications, lack of functional or survival
advantage comparing to cadaveric transplantation, and the shortened waiting time for sicker
patients provided by the new lung allocation system (Kotloff and Thabut [2012])). Reflecting
the almost total absence of living donors for lung transplantation, the focus here is on
deceased-donor transplantations only.
Statistics in UNOS [2011] also show that from 2009 to 2011 only twenty patients refused
when offered a transplant, indicating patient choice is practically negligible in modeling lung
transplantation. Therefore, in modeling lung transplantation here we ignore the possibility
of organ refusal.
Candidates aged sixty-five years or older have been added to the waiting list faster
than candidates in other age groups (UNOS [2011]), as it has become more accepted that
functional age is more important than chronological age in predicting potential outcomes
(Kotloff and Thabut [2012]). Because of the importance of recording changes in patients’
functional age during their time on the lung transplantation waiting list, recorded health
characteristics are updated over time for patients in the waiting list (UNOS [2011]).
Lung transplantations may take one of several forms. Single lung transplantation and
bilateral lung transplantation currently make up the majority of all procedures. Heart-lung
transplantation is also an option for patients with certain diagnoses. Underlying diseases
and other health related characteristics of patients are the main factors in choosing between
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
procedures (Kotloff and Thabut [2012]). Consequently, the difference in the benefit of the
various procedures as a function of patients’ health characteristics must also be taken into
account in modeling lung transplantation.
1.5 Current Lung Allocation Strategies
Currently in the United States, lungs are allocated to transplant candidates primarily on
the basis of age, geography, blood type (ABO) compatibility, and the Lung Allocation
Score (LAS). Since the implementation of LAS in 2005, candidates waiting for lungs receive
priority for deceased donor lung offers based on their LAS if they are at least twelve years
of age. Candidates less than twelve years of age receive deceased donor lung offers based on
medical urgency (UNOS [2015]). The difference between allocation rules for children and for
adults is due to the difficulty in developing accurate models of outcomes for young pediatric
patients. The difficulty stems from the diversity in diagnoses and the small numbers of
pediatric patients (Sweet [2009]).
The LAS is computed from two measures: the Waitlist Urgency Measure and the Post-
transplant Survival Measure. The measures are, respectively, estimates of the expected
number of days a candidate will live without a transplant during an additional year on the
waiting list, and the expected number of days a candidate will live during the first year
post-transplant.
Proportional hazard regressions with time-varying covariates are fitted by UNOS to
compute the Waitlist Urgency Measure and the Post-transplant Survival Measure of patients.
Predictors in the model include age, lung function measurements, pulmonary diagnoses, and
interactions of these variables. Predictors are required to be updated for each patient at
least once in every six months (UNOS [2015]). Potential future changes in the values of the
predictors while patients are waiting for transplants and the resulting changes in the hazards,
however, are not reflected in the LAS: at each update of the LAS, expected survivals are
computed as if patients’ health characteristics would remain constant in the future.
The LAS is the difference between the Post-transplant Survival Measure and twice the
Waitlist Urgency Measure, normalized to a scale ranging from zero to one hundred. When
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an organ is available, patients in the waiting list are ranked according to their LAS values
(estimated from most recently recorded predictor values). The candidate with the highest
LAS has priority for transplantation (UNOS [2015]).
Prioritizing via the LAS was an ad-hoc approach originally implemented to minimize
wait-list mortality while considering the probability of post-transplant survival. Allocating
lungs using the LAS also had the effect of de-emphasizing time on the waiting list, reduc-
ing incentive for early listing (UNOS [2011]). However, recent studies have demonstrated
that LAS might have the effect of increasing post-transplant morbidity and mortality as
well as increasing the risk of post-transplant complications (Liu et al. [2010], Russo et al.
[2010, 2011]). To address these and other concerns, and to seek possible modifications and
refinements, the LAS is under regular review, with new factors that are predictive to life
outcomes and reflect medical urgency under consideration for inclusion in the proportional
hazard regressions (Kotloff and Thabut [2012]).
1.6 Proposed Model and Overview of Results
We propose a model for the lung transplantation waiting list based on common character-
istics shared by different organ types and on characteristics unique to lungs. Patient and
organ arrivals are modeled as independent homogeneous Poisson processes. Counterfactual
patient health status trajectories, that is, trajectories that would be observed were there no
transplantations, are modeled as independent and identically distributed Markov processes.
It is shown that with these assumptions, with any allocation rule satisfying certain
fairness criteria, the waiting list has a unique limiting distribution as calendar time increases.
And on average, patients entering the waiting list are transplanted according to a unique
allocation-rule-specific limiting transplantation rate, which is a function of waiting time and
health state. The long-term average of patients’ total life (in-waiting-list life plus post-
transplantation life) and the long-term average of patients’ life gain from transplantation,
represented as functionals of the limiting transplantation rate, are used as the standards for
comparing fair allocation rules.
It is also shown that the expected proportion of transplanted patients is bounded by the
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ratio of the intensity of organ arrivals to that of patient arrivals, and that the transplantation
rate satisfies boundedness constraints related to the counterfactual transition rate. We frame
the problem of solving for the optimal fair allocation rule as the search for the limiting waiting
time and health state specific transplantation rate that optimizes the long-term average life
subject to the boundedness constraints.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are used to characterize the form of the optimal
limiting transplantation rate. As will be seen, the optimal rate is nonzero at waiting time
and health state where the difference between the expected residual life with an immediate
transplantation and the expected residual life without an immediate transplantation but
with the possibility of future transplantation opportunities, is greater than one minus the
probability of future transplantations, scaled by a penalty parameter associated with the
ratio of organ arrival rate to patient arrival rate.
Not every transplantation rate satisfying the constraints is a limiting rate for some alloca-
tion strategies. And in particular, the rate corresponding to the solution of the optimization
problem is not achievable. When an organ is available, patients in the waiting list that are
alive and not transplanted do not necessarily include those at waiting times and states where
the optimal rate is non-zero.
Here we propose an allocation strategy that is designed so that the corresponding waiting
time and health state specific transplantation rate is close to the rate corresponding to the
solution of the optimization problem. The specific form of the proposed allocation strategy
is based on the observation that as the rate of organ arrivals increases, the set of waiting
time and health state combinations for which the transplantation rates corresponding to the
optimal solution are non-zero increases monotonically: the proposed strategy is to allocate
according to the index defined by the order in which combinations enter the allocable set.
Finally, simulation studies are conducted with model parameters estimated from national
lung transplantation data from United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Results of
simulations show that the proposed allocation strategy can provide a non-trivial gain in
expected total life of patients over that of the current LAS system.
In what follows, the second chapter presents notation for the model for lung transplan-
tation. The third chapter characterizes the comparison of allocation rules in terms of a
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constrained optimization problem. The fourth chapter provides the solution of the con-
strained optimization problem. The fifth chapter presents a practical allocation strategy in
the form of an allocation index based on the solution. The sixth chapter compares average
total life of patients with the proposed allocation strategy and the LAS by simulation stud-
ies, in which the data are generated with parameters estimated from the UNOS data. The
final chapter describes where the current research might be expanded.
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Chapter 2
Notation
In this chapter, we introduce notation for patient and organ arrivals, trajectories of patients’
health characteristics, and patients’ life outcomes. Then the notation is used to characterize
fair allocation rules and to define the standards for comparing allocation rules (the long-
term average total life and the long-term average life gain from transplantation). The
waiting list is modeled in terms of time of waiting and observed transitions of individual
patients while they remain on the list. Allocation rules are modeled in terms of the indices of
transplanted patients. Only fair allocation rules are considered in the comparison, and the
fairness requirement is characterized in terms of how the waiting list evolves when organs are
available for transplantation and allocation decisions are made. Patients’ limiting average
total life, including both in-waiting-list life and post-transplantation life, and the limiting
average life gain from transplantation, are represented in terms of the life outcomes and
actual transitions, and are used as the standards in comparing fair allocation rules.
2.1 Modeling the Waiting List
Let τ <∞ denote the intensity of the Poisson process of patient arrivals to the waiting list,
and let 0 < T1 < T2 < . . . denote the patients’ arrival times. For convenience, let NI denote
the number of patient arrivals in calendar time interval I ⊂ [0,∞). Let ρ < ∞ denote the
intensity of the Poisson process of organ arrivals, and let 0 < S1 < S2 < . . . denote the
arrival times of organs. Let OI denote the number of organ arrivals in calendar time interval
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I ⊂ [0,∞). Assume organ arrivals are independent of patient arrivals. We are interested in
settings when ρ < τ , as otherwise the supply of organs would generally meet the demand,
and there would be no need for an allocation rule.
Let X = {0, 1, ..., n} denote the finite set of possible patient states, where, without loss
of generality, 0 denotes the absorbing state corresponding to death. Let {X(s) : s ≥ 0}
denote a generic health status trajectory indexed by waiting time and let R(s) denote a
generic counterfactual post-transplant residual life if transplantation occurs at waiting time
s ≥ 0. Assume that the characterization of patient health states is sufficiently informa-
tive such that for any s ≥ 0, R(s) and σ({X(u) : u < s}) are conditionally indepen-
dent given σ(X(s)). Assume further that sups≥0,i∈X E (|R(s)| | X(s) = i) < ∞. Denote
µi(s) = E (R(s) | X(s) = i) for any i ∈ X and s ≥ 0 and let µs = (µ1(s), . . . , µn(s)).
Let T be the upper bound of a patient’s waiting time (waiting times are limited by
reasonable bounds on the human life-span). That is, let P (X(s) = 0) = 1 for all s ≥ T . Let
the vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) denote the distribution of patients’ initial states upon arrival,
where pi = P (X(0) = i) for each i ∈ X . As patients must enter the waiting list alive,
1n · p = 1, where 1n is the vector of length n with all elements being 1.
Assume {X(s) : s ≥ 0} is a càdlàg Markov process with transition kernel ps,t(i, j) and
infinitesimal generator qij(s) = limt↓s(ps,t(i, j)−I(i = j))/(t−s), where I(·) is the indicator
function. Suppose the total transition rate −qii(s) =
∑
j 6=i qij(s) <∞. In addition, suppose
the expected number of transitions in any finite waiting time interval is finite, for which a
sufficient condition is
´ T
0 qij(s)ds <∞ for any i, j ∈ X .
Let {(X(k)(s), R(k)(s)) : s ≥ 0} denote the health status trajectories and counterfac-
tual post-transplant residual life processes of the kth patient. Assume {(X(k)(s), R(k)(s)) :
s ≥ 0, k ∈ N} are independent and identically distributed according to the generic pair
{(X(s), R(s)) : s ≥ 0} and are independent of {Tk, Sj : i, j ∈ N}.
An allocation sequence J1, J2, . . . is a random sequence of indices of patients who receive
transplantation, such that for each i ∈ N, TJi ≤ Si, X(Ji)(Si − TJi) 6= 0, and Ji 6= Jk if
i 6= k. This definition reflects that patients who receive transplantation must have entered
the waiting list and still be alive at the time of allocation, and that no patient receives more
than one organ.
CHAPTER 2. NOTATION 13
Let T (k)T denote time waited until transplantation for the kth patient, that is, T
(k)
T =
Si−Tk if Ji = k and T
(k)
T =∞ if k /∈ {Ji : i ∈ N}. Let (n+1) denote the post-transplantation
state and let X0 = X ∪{n+ 1} denote the augmented patient state space. The kth patient’s
actual trajectory {X̃(k)(s) : s ≥ 0} is defined on X0 as
X̃(k)(s) = X(k)(s) · I(s < T (k)T ) + (n+ 1) · I(s ≥ T
(k)
T )
for any s ≥ 0.
Remark. X̃(k)(s) is a càdlàg process since both X(k)(s) and the organ arrival process are
càdlàg.
The following filtrations are generated by events including patient and organ arrivals,
patients’ counterfactual health state transitions and allocation decisions.
Definition 2.1.1. (Filtrations)
For calendar time t ≥ 0, let
Ft := σ
(
Tk, Si, Ji, {X(k)(s) : s ∈ [0, t− Tk]} : Tk, Si ∈ [0, t]
)
,
so that {Ft : t ≥ 0} is the filtration generated by all patient and organ arrivals, counterfactual
transitions and allocations up to calendar time t. Also define the filtration
Gt := σ
(
Tk, Si, {X(k)(s) : s ∈ [0, t− Tk]} : Tk, Si ∈ [0, t]
)
∨ σ(Ji : Si < t),
which excludes the allocation decision at t.
At any time, the currently observed waiting list consists of patients who have arrived
and have not died or received transplantation. To simplify the expression, we first introduce
the following index set of available patients:
Definition 2.1.2. (Index Set of Patients Available for Transplantation)
For any allocation sequence J = {J1, J2, . . . }, define the random patient index set at
each calendar time t ≥ 0 (for simplicity, the index J is omitted in the notation)
It := {k ∈ N : Tk ≤ t, X̃(k)(t− Tk) /∈ {0, n+ 1}}
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of patients who have arrived before (including) t and are alive and have not been transplanted
at t. Let |It| denote the number of elements in It.
Remark. Since for each k,
I(k ∈ It) = I(Tk ≤ t, X̃(k)(t− Tk) /∈ {0, n+ 1})
= I(Tk ≤ t, X(k)(t− Tk) 6= 0, k /∈ {Ji : Si ≤ t}),
It is adapted to {Ft}. Moreover, since I(Tk ≤ t) and I(X̃(k)(t−Tk) /∈ {0, n+ 1}) are càdlàg
processes,
⋂∞




It−1/n = {k ∈ N : Tk < t, X̃(k)((t− Tk)−) /∈ {0, n+ 1}},
which is the index set of patients in the current list who are alive and have not been
transplanted before time t. Let |It−| denote the number of elements in It−.
If an organ becomes available at time t, a patient in It will be selected for transplantation.
Here we allow the allocation to happen right after a change in the patient’s health state at t,
that is, suppose the kth patient is selected, it is possible that X(k)((t−Tk)−) 6= X(k)(t−Tk)
while X̃(k)(t− Tk) = n+ 1, though such events have zero probability.
In what follows, the waiting list process is characterized in terms of the state and waiting
time pairs of patients who are alive and not transplanted at t.
Definition 2.1.3. (The Waiting List Process)
On the state space W = ∪∞d=1([0, T ]×X )d ∪ {w0} and its Borel σ-algebra B(W ), where
w0 denotes the empty state corresponding to |It| = 0, define the waiting list process:
Wt := {(t− Tk, X̃(k)(t− Tk)) : k ∈ It}. (2.1)
Remark. Since It is adapted to the filtration {Ft : t ≥ 0} and (2.1) is equal to {(t −
Tk, X
(k)(t−Tk)) : k ∈ It}, {Wt : t ≥ 0} is also adapted to {Ft}. As potential discontinuities
of {Wt : t ≥ 0} can only be results of arrivals of patients and organs, or of transitions in
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X̃(k), which are càdlàg, Wt is càdlàg. By the definition of Wt,
Wt− = {(t− Tk, X̃(k)((t− Tk)−)) : k ∈ It−}.
For convenience, also introduce the following notation for the waiting list right before
potential allocations.
Definition 2.1.4. (Waiting List Before Allocation)
Denote the waiting list before potential allocation at calendar time t by
W ′t := {(t − Tk, X(k)(t − Tk)) : Tk ≤ t, k /∈ {Ji : Si < t}, X(k)(t − Tk) 6= 0}. (2.2)
Remark. {W ′t : t ≥ 0} is adapted to the filtration {Gt : t ≥ 0} as I(k /∈ {Ji : Si < t}) ∈ Gt.
Moreover, W ′t is progressively measurable as each component in (2.2) is either right or left
continuous and thus progressively measurable.
2.2 Fair Allocation Rules
Allocation rules should satisfy fairness requirements. Our definition of fairness of an allo-
cation sequence are as follows: given the information of the waiting list up to the time of
allocation, fair allocation decisions should only depend on the waiting times and states of
patients who are currently alive and not transplanted, along with a possible randomization
that is conditionally independent of the history of the waiting list given the current state
of the waiting list. In addition, only realistic allocation rules that are non-informative of
patients’ post-transplant residual life are considered.
Note that by the definition of the filtration {Gt : t ≥ 0}, for any j ∈ N, Sj is a {Gt} –
stopping time. Let
GSj := {A : A ∩ {Sj ≤ t} ∈ Gt, ∀ t ≥ 0}
denote the σ-algebra generated by information in {Gt} up to the arrival time of the jth
organ. NoteW ′Sj is measurable with respect to GSj asW
′
s is progressively measurable. Then
the fairness requirement is formally characterized in terms of the behavior of the jump of
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the waiting list due to allocations when organs are available.
Definition 2.2.1. (Fair Allocation Rules)
An allocation sequence J = {J1, J2, . . . } is termed fair, if for any j ∈ N and A ∈ B(W ),
P (WSj ∈ A | GSj ) = γJ (A;W ′Sj ), (2.3)
where γJ is a transition kernel: for any A ∈ B(W ), γJ (A; ·) is a measurable function on
(W,B(W )), and for any fixed w ∈W , γJ (·;w) is a probability measure on (W,B(W )).
In addition to the fairness requirement, assume that J = {J1, J2, . . . } are such that for
any j ∈ N and A ∈ B(W ),
P (WSj ∈ A |W ′Sj , {Si, Tk : i, k ∈ N}) = γ
J (A;W ′Sj ), (2.4)
P (WSj ∈ A |W ′Sj , {X
(k)(s), R(k)(s) : s ≥ 0, k ∈ N}) = γJ (A;W ′Sj ), (2.5)
as given the current waiting list, allocation decisions should be conditionally independent
of arrivals, counterfactual transitions and residual life, including those would happen in the
future.
2.3 Long-term Average Total Life as the Standard
The limiting long-term average of patients’ total life (in-waiting-list life plus post-transplant
life) as the calendar time increases is used as the standard for comparing fair allocation
rules. The following counting process notation for each patient’s counterfactual and actual
transitions will facilitate the representation of the limiting average total life:
Definition 2.3.1. (Counting Processes and At-risk Indicators)




ij (s) := I(X̃
(k)(s−) = i, X̃(k)(s) = j),




ij (u) is the number of actual transitions from state i to j in
waiting time interval (s, t]. Similarly, for the counterfactual transitions, let N (k)ij (s, t] :=







ij (s) := I(X
(k)(s−) = i,X(k)(s) = j).
Also define at-risk indicators for the kth patient’s actual transitions. For i ∈ X0 and
s ≥ 0, let
Ỹ
(k)





i (s−) := I(X̃
(k)(s−) = i).
Similarly, for counterfactual transitions, let
Y
(k)





i (s−) := I(X
(k)(s−) = i).
The kth patient’s time of waiting until exit from the list due to death or transplantation
is inft≥0{X(k)(t) = 0} ∧ T (k)T , and thus the total life, including life in-waiting list and post-
transplantation, can be represented with the counting process notation as
inf
t≥0






The limiting long-term average of total life of all patients ever enter the list, including






















It is also of interest to know the life gain from transplantation, that is, the difference
between the potential residual life if the patient is currently at a certain waiting time and
state and is transplanted immediately and the potential residual life if the patient is never
transplanted.
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{X(k)(t) = 0} − s
)
(2.7)
be the difference between the kth patient’s counterfactual post-transplantation residual life
if transplanted at waiting time s and the counterfactual residual life if never transplanted.
Let µ̃s = (µ̃1(s), . . . , µ̃n(s)), where µ̃i(s) := E(R̃(k)(s) | X(k)(s) = i) is the expected life
gain for patients transplanted at waiting time s ≥ 0 and state i ∈ X .
The limiting average life gain from transplantation, if exists, can be represented with














Remark. By the definition (2.7), for any k ∈ N,
inf
t≥0

































































T < ∞ and dÑ
(k)
i,n+1(s) = 0 for all i ∈ X and
s ≥ 0 if T (k)T =∞, in either case,
inf
t≥0














which is the counterfactual total life of the kth patient if never transplanted. Therefore,
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(2.6) and (2.8) are only different by a constant that is invariant to the choice of allocation
rules, and using (2.6) and (2.8) as standards in comparing fair allocation rules are equivalent.
In chapters 3 and for the continuous-time model in chapter 4 and 5, we will focus on the
long-term average residual life gain (2.8) for simplicity of expressions. For the discrete-time
model in chapter 4 and 5 and the simulation studies in chapter 6, results are presented in
the form of the average total life (2.6) for easiness of interpretations.
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Chapter 3
The Optimization Problem
In the previous chapter, the problem of comparing allocation rules is formulated as the
comparison of limiting average total life, or equivalently, limiting average life gain from
transplantation, among waiting lists under fair allocation rules. Two questions arise nat-
urally. First, it is unknown whether the limits (2.6) and (2.8) exist. Second, if the limits
exist, given a fair allocation rule, how to calculate (2.6) and (2.8).
This chapter address the above questions by showing that with any fair allocation rule,
there exists a limiting transplantation rate for any pair of waiting time and health state,
such that on average patients in the waiting list are allocated according to the transplan-
tation rate. The limiting average total life (2.6) and the limiting average life gain from
transplantation (2.8) are then shown to be well defined and are represented in terms of the
transplantation rate.
It is also shown the transplantation rate should satisfy certain constraints. In particular,
the limiting proportion of transplanted patients, which is a functional of the transplan-
tation rate, is bounded by the ratio of the organ arrival rate to the patient arrival rate.
Also, the transplantation rate should satisfy certain boundedness constraints related to the
counterfactual transition rate.
With the representation of the long-term average life in terms of the transplantation
rate and the constraints, fair allocation rules can be compared through their corresponding
transplantation rates. A constrained optimization problem is formulated with the derived
objective function and constraints, and we hope the solution of the optimal transplantation
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rate can give hints to the development of efficient allocation strategies.
3.1 Long-term Average Occupancy
To define the transplantation rate, we first show the waiting list with any fair allocation rule





of any state i ∈ X at any waiting time s ≥ 0 converges almost surely as calendar time t
increases. An alternative treatment of the results based on the fact that the waiting list is
a Piecewise Deterministic Markov Process (PDMP) is given in Section B in the appendix.
In the next section, the transplantation rate is characterized in terms of the difference
between the limiting average occupancy and the counterfactual occupancy absent transplan-
tation.
Theorem 3.1.1. (The Strong Markov Property)
With any fair allocation sequence J = {J1, J2, . . . } that satisfies conditions (2.3), (2.4)




: t ≥ 0
}




: s ≤ t
}
.




: t ≥ 0
}
is strong Markov with respect to any




: s ≤ t
}
. Let the increasing sequence T̃1 < T̃2 < . . .





{T̃i : i ∈ N} = {Tk : k ∈ N} ∪ {Sj : j ∈ N} ∪ {t > 0 : Wt 6= Wt−}
= {Tk : k ∈ N} ∪ {Sj : j ∈ N}





is deterministic between the jumps with the only changing compo-
nents being patients’ waiting times, by results in Section 4 of Davis [1984], for any stopping
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WT̃1 , N[0,T̃1], O[0,T̃1]
)
, . . . , T̃i−1,
(
WT̃i−1 , N[0,T̃i−1], O[0,T̃i−1]
))
,
such that for any i ∈ N,
t0 · I(t0 ∈ (T̃i−1, T̃i]) = (T̃i ∧ τi) · I(t0 ∈ (T̃i−1, T̃i]),
which indicates that for any stopping time t0, t0 is either 0, T̃i for some i ∈ N, or T̃i−1 +τi for
some i ∈ N on {t0 < ∞}. Let t1 = inf
{









then in any of the above cases, by (3.1),
P ({t1 > t0 + s} ∩ {t0 <∞} | F̃t0) = F (s,Wt0) · I(t0 <∞), (3.2)
where F (s, x) is the survival function of inter-jump times from state x of the waiting list, by
the Markov properties of patient and organ arrivals and patients’ counterfactual transitions.
Given that the allocations satisfy the fairness requirement (2.3), the post-jump state, in-
cluding the post-transplantation state, is independent of {F̃s : s < t0} given
(
Wt0 , N[0,t0], O[0,t0]
)
,
as for any B ∈ B(W ) and n, o ∈ N,













I(Wt1 ∈ B,N[0,t1] = n,O[0,t1] = o) | Gt1
)
= P (Wt1 ∈ B | Gt1) · I
(
N[0,t1] = n,O[0,t1] = o
)
= P (Wt1 ∈ B |W ′t1) · I
(
N[0,t1] = n,O[0,t1] = o
)
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by the fairness requirement (2.3), and
E
[
P (Wt1 ∈ B |W ′t1) · I
(






P (Wt1 ∈ B |W ′t1) · I
(




Wt0 , N[0,t0], O[0,t0]
)]
(3.4)
by discussing the type of t1 in (3.1) and using the independence between the counterfactual
transitions and patient and organ arrivals and the Markov property of the arrivals and
counterfactual transitions. Combining (3.3) and (3.4) with (3.2) and applying the above
argument recursively lead to the desired strong Markov property.
Essentially, the waiting list process {Wt : t ≥ 0} and the arrivals of patients and organs
are piecewise deterministic Markov processes (PDMP) and the strong Markov property can
be shown as in Davis [1993]. For a detailed study of the waiting list process as a PDMP,
including its constructions and transition kernel, see the optional chapter in Appendix B.
The next result shows that the waiting list with any fair allocation rule is positive
recurrent to the empty state w0. Note here w0 is selected as the recurrent state for the
simplicity of the proof, and the positive recurrence of the waiting list can also be shown
with other states that may take much shorter time for the waiting list to return to.
Proposition 3.1.2. Let τw0 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Wt = w0} be the first time the waiting list
becomes empty. Then ∀w ∈W ,
Ew [τw0 ] <∞, (3.5)
where Ew is the expectation under the probability Pw of the waiting list process given the
waiting list starts at state w.













(1− Pw(τw0 ≤ s))ds+
ˆ ∞
T

















The first inequality is a result of
{
∃ i ∈ {1, . . . , ds/T e} : N[(i−1)T, iT ] = 0
}
⊂ {τw0 ≤ s},
which describes that if at least one of the intervals [(i− 1)T, iT ] has no patient arrival, then
all existing patients in the waiting list will die before a new patient arrives, and the waiting
list must return to the empty state at least once before s. The equation
Pw(∃ i ∈ {1, . . . , ds/T e} : N[(i−1)T,iT ] = 0) = 1− (1− e−Tτ )ds/T e
is shown by the property of independent increments of Poisson process.
As a result of the positive recurrence, one can define the infinite sequence of return times
{Mi : i = 0, 1, 2, . . . }, where M0 = 0 and
Mi := inf{t > Mi−1 : Wt = w0}
for all i ≥ 1. The next result states the waiting list can be partitioned into independent and
identically distributed epochs using the recurrence times.
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Proposition 3.1.3. ∀ i ∈ N and any measurable set B ∈ B(W ),
P (Wt+Mi ∈ B | F̃Mi) = Pw0(Wt ∈ B).
Moreover, {Mi −Mi−1, i = 1, 2, . . . } are independent and identically distributed with finite
expectations.
Proof. We first show by induction that Mi, i = 0, 1, . . . are stopping times with respect to
the filtration {F̃t : t ≥ 0}. M0 = 0 is a stopping time of {F̃t}. Assume Mi−1 is a stopping
time of {F̃t}, then {Mi−1 ≤ t} ∈ F̃t for all t ≥ 0. Since
{Mi ≤ t} = {Mi−1 ≤ t}∩⋂
k∈N
{




{Tk ∈ (Mi−1, t]} ∩ {X̃(k)(t) ∈ {0, n+ 1}}
}
,
and each set on the right side is in F̃t by the definition of the filtration, Mi is also a stopping
time of {F̃t}.
As shown previously, the waiting list process Wt is a strong Markov process with respect
to the filtration F̃t. For any i ∈ N, since E(Mi) < ∞, P (Mi < ∞) = 1. Therefore
∀B ∈ B(W ),
P (Wt+Mi ∈ B | F̃Mi) = P(w0,N[0,Mi],O[0,Mi])(Wt ∈ B) = Pw0(Wt ∈ B),
by the independent increment of arrivals and the independence between counterfactual tran-
sitions and the arrivals.
As a corollary, Mi −Mi−1, i = 1, 2, . . . are independent and identically distributed, and
E(Mi −Mi−1) = E(M1) <∞ by the positive recurrence.
Now we are ready to show the main result of this section that the average of patients’
occupancy of any state i ∈ X at waiting time s ∈ [0, T ] converges as calendar time increases.
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Theorem 3.1.4. (Existence and Definition of πi(s) and πi(s−))

















exist almost surely. Moreover, πi(s) is of finite variation and càdlàg with left limits πi(s−).
Denote vectors πs = (π1(s), . . . , πn(s)) and πs− = (π1(s−), . . . , πn(s−)). Let π0− = p,
which is the distribution of patients’ initial states upon arrival.


































X )k−1 × (s, i) × ([0, T ] × X )d−k ∈ B(W ). Therefore by Proposition 3.1.3 and the property





i (s) : j ∈ 1, . . . , Lt + 1
}
CHAPTER 3. THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM 27
















which is bounded by Ew0(N[0,M1)). For convenience, we omit w0 in Ew0 as the waiting list
starts from the empty state. Note N([0, t)) − τt is a {F̃t} – martingale, by the optional
sampling theorem, for any t > 0, E(N[0,M1∧t)) = τE(M1 ∧ t). Letting t → ∞, by the
Monotone and Dominated Convergence theorem, E(N[0,M1)) = τE(M1) <∞ by the positive
recurrence. By the elementary renewal theorem, E(t−1Lt) → E(M1)−1. Therefore by the



































































ji (0, s] are non-decreasing with respect to s, πi(s)
is of finite variation.











CHAPTER 3. THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM 28











almost surely, for the probability of the convergence does not hold is bounded by a countable
sum of zeros when intersecting with {N[0,t] = k} for k ∈ N. Then by (3.8),













As ε → 0, the right side converges to zero by the Dominated Convergence Theorem. The
right continuity of πi is shown similarly.
Without organ allocations, the average occupancy of state i at waiting time s would
converge to the counterfactual probability of a patient being in state i at waiting time s.
Therefore, the difference between the actual and the counterfactual limiting average occu-
pancy reveals the allocation rate to patients in a state at a given waiting time. In what
follows, we define the limiting transplantation rate in terms of the difference between the
actual and counterfactual limiting average occupancies, and show that the defined trans-
plantation rate is indeed the limiting average rate at which patients are transplanted.
3.2 Limiting Transplantation Rate
To start with, we define the following matrix Q of measures induced by patients’ counter-
factual transitions.
Definition 3.2.1. Let Q be the measure matrix such that for any i, j ∈ X and Borel set





where q is the matrix of counterfactual transition rates.
For any waiting time s ∈ [0, T ], πs−dQs is the potential change in the average occupancy
if there is no transplantation, while dπ is the actual change in the average occupancy. The
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transplantation rate is defined as the difference between the counterfactual and the actual
change in the long-term average occupancy:
Definition 3.2.2. (Limiting Transplantation Rate)
For any waiting time s ∈ [0, T ], let Ψs := (Ψ1(s), . . . ,Ψn(s)) denote the vector of
cumulative transplantation rate, where
dΨs = πs−dQs − dπs. (3.9)
Whenever πi(s−) 6= 0, define the diagonal matrix dΛ, in which the ith diagonal element
dΛi(s) = dΨi(s)/πi(s−).
If πi(s−) = 0, it is shown later in Proposition 3.4.2 that dΨi(s) ∈ [0, {πs−dQs}i], where
{·}i denotes the ith element of the vector. In this case, let
Λi({s}) = dΨi(s)/{πs−dQs}i.
As calendar time increases, the limiting average rate of transplantation to patients in









In what follows, we present the main result of this section, in which (3.10) is formulated and
proved with probability rigor.
Theorem 3.2.3. Suppose {(H(k)(s), X(k)(s)) : s ≥ 0} are independent copies of a generic
process {(H(s), X(s)) : s ≥ 0} and are independent of {Tk, Sj : k, j ∈ N}. Assume that for
all j, k ∈ N, s ≥ 0 and A ∈ B(W ),
H(k)(s) ⊥ σ({X(k)(u) : u ≤ s}) | X(k)(s) (3.11)
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and
P (WSj ∈ A |W ′Sj , {H
(k)(s) : s ≥ 0}) = P (WSj ∈ A |W ′Sj ). (3.12)






∣∣X(s) = i ] <∞. (3.13)
















E[H(s) | X(s) = i ] dΨi(s) (3.14)
almost surely.
Remark. Note that condition (3.12) is the same as condition (2.5), implying the result can
be applied to the residual life R(k)(s). Moreover, a special case of Theorem 3.2.3 is when
{H(s) : s ≥ 0} are bounded deterministic functions. In particular, when H(k)(s) ≡ 1, it















This special case is useful later in showing the constraint Ψ should satisfy as a result of the
scarcity of organs.




































i,n+1(s) : j = 1, 2 . . .
}
are independent and
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identically distributed, so that a Strong Law of Large Numbers argument as in Theorem 3.1.4

























B1 ∩B2 ∩ {N[0,Mj−1) = n1} ∩ {O[0,Mj−1) = o1}
∩ {N[Mj−1,Mj) = n2} ∩ {O[Mj−1,Mj) = o2}
)
. (3.16)
Since for all n1, n2, o1, o2 ∈ N, on {N[0,Mj−1) = n1} ∩ {O[0,Mj−1) = o1} ∩ {N[Mj−1,Mj) =














H(k)(Si − Tk) · I(Si − TJi = Si − Tk) ∈ A2
}
,
where {Si − Tk : i ≤ o1, k ≤ n1} are independent of {Si − Tk : i > o1, k > n1}, and




: t ≥ 0
}
,
the independence among {(H(k), X(k)) : k ∈ N}, the independence between {(H(k), X(k)) :
k ∈ N} and {Tk, Sj : k, j ∈ N}, and condition (3.12), {{H(k)(s) : s ≥ 0}, Si−Tk, Si−TJi : i ≤




are independent of {{H(k)(s) : s ≥ 0}, Si−Tk, Si−TJi :













B2 ∩ {N[0,Mj) = n2} ∩ {O([Mj−1,Mj + u)) = o2}
)
= P (B1) · P (B2).




















































(k)(s), X(k)(s−), Jj , Sj : Sj ∈ [0, Tk + s]
)
∈ FTk+s
and {Tk < M1} ∈ FTk∧M1 ⊂ FTk ⊂ FTk+s that
E
[

















∣∣FTk+s) dÑ (k)i,n+1(s)], (3.18)




























∣∣X(s) = i ]E(N[0,M1)) <∞,
given (3.13) and the fact that E(N[0,M1)) = τE(M1) <∞.
By the Strong Law of Large Numbers and a similar calculation of the expectation by
CHAPTER 3. THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM 33





























H(s) | X(s) = i
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j (s−) (3.20)
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H(s) | X(s) = i
]
({πs−dQ}i − dπi(s)),
which gives the desired result.
3.3 Long-term Average Life
Recall the limiting average total life (2.6) and the limiting average life gain from trans-
plantation (2.8) are averages of integrals of life quantities on dÑ (k)i,n+1(s) in the limit. In
what follows, we use Theorem 3.2.3 to show the existence of (2.6) and (2.8) by representing
them as integrals with respect to dΨ. As shown previously, each fair allocation rule has
a corresponding limiting transplantation rate Ψ. Therefore in addition to delineating the
practical meaning of Ψ, Theorem 3.2.3 also provides a means to showing the existence of
the objective used in comparing allocations rules and explicitly characterizing the effect of
any fair allocation rule on the objective.
Theorem 3.3.1. (Calculation of Average Total Life)








Proof. The limiting average total life (2.6) is the sum of limiting average in-waiting-list life




















Since each patient’s in-waiting-list life is bounded by T , by Fubini-Tonelli and the Dominated
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0 (s) 6= 1, Ỹ
(k)


































The following representation of the limiting long-term average life gain from transplan-
tation in terms of µ̃ and Ψ can be shown similarly.
Theorem 3.3.2. (Long-term Average Life Gain)

















dΨs · µ̃s (3.24)
almost surely.
Proof. The desired result comes directly from condition (2.5) and Theorem 3.2.3.
3.4 Constraints on the Transplantation Rate
With standards of limiting average life represented in terms of Ψ as in (3.22) and (3.24),
fair allocation rules can be compared through their corresponding transplantation rates. To
search for the optimal fair allocation rule that maximizes the limiting average life, a natural
method is to solve for the optimal transplantation rate, and then find fair allocation rules
that lead to the targeted transplantation rate.
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However, not every Ψ has a corresponding fair allocation rule. Admissible Ψ should also
satisfy certain constraints, which are discussed in this section.
First, the proportion of transplanted patients in all patients ever enter the waiting list,
in the limit as calendar time tends to infinity, is bounded by the ratio of organ arrival rate
to patient arrival rate, which leads to the following constraint on Ψ:






Proof. The limiting proportion of patients who ever receive transplantation is
lim
l→∞















Let H(s) = 1 for all s ≤ 0, then as noted before, {H(s)} satisfies conditions in Theorem

















which is bounded by ρ/τ since the ratio of the number of organ arrivals to the number of
patient arrivals converges to the ratio ρ/τ of arrival rates almost surely.
In addition to (3.22), definitions of π and Ψ imply the following boundedness constraints.
Essentially, since the change in the limiting occupancy of any state at any moment is the
difference between the inflow of transitions from other states and the outflow of transitions
to other states and of transplantations at that moment, the transplantation rate is bounded
by the maximal allowance of the occupancy that can be used to flow out for transplantation.
Proposition 3.4.2. For all s ≥ 0 and i ∈ X ,
1. πi(s) ∈ [0, πi(s−)], dπi(s) ∈ (−∞, {πs−dQs}i],
2. Ψi({s}) ∈ [0, πi(s−)], dΨi(s) ∈ [0,∞),
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3. If πi(s−) = 0, then dπi(s) ∈ [0, {πs−dQs}i] and dΨi(s) ∈ [0, {πs−dQs}i].




i (s)/N[0,t]. Since for any


















































































{πs−dQs}i almost surely, as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.2.3.




















which concludes the proof of the first statement. The second statement is a corollary of the
first and the definition of Ψ.





























If πi(s−) = 0, letting s2 = s and s1 ↑ s2 in (3.26) leads to dπi(s) ≥ 0.
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Chapter 4
Solution to the Optimization Problem
Results in the previous chapter provide an approach to comparing fair allocation rules and
searching for the optimal fair allocation rule. With the objective (3.22) (or equivalently,
(3.24)) and constraints in (3.25) and Proposition 3.4.2, represented in terms of the limit-
ing transplantation rate Ψ, the comparison of fair allocation rules can be formulated as
the comparison of transplantation rates, and, one hopes, the optimal fair allocation rule
can be obtained by first solving for the optimal transplantation rate and then finding the
corresponding fair allocation rule.
This chapter addresses the problem of characterizing the optimal transplantation rate
that maximizes the objective while satisfying the constraints. There are two challenges in
the problem: the first is that the constraints in the primal problem add difficulties to the
search for the optimal Ψ; the second is that the problem has a recursive nature, as the trans-
plantation rate at waiting time s affects patients’ actual transitions after s, which in turn
affects allocation decisions after s. In what follows, we use the primal-dual problem frame-
work to convert the constrained problem to an unconstrained problem, in which a penalty
parameter c is used to represent the constraint on the limiting proportion of transplanted
patients. Then we apply the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations to the unconstrained prob-
lem and recursively solve for the optimal transplantation rate given any value of the penalty
parameter c. For the objective and constraints derived in the previous chapter, we show the
solution to the primal problem is the same as the solution to the dual problem, in which the
penalty c is solved such that the penalized objective is minimal.
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When it is difficult to fully specify the infinite dimensional model parameters such as
the expected residual life µ and the counterfactual transition kernel Q, a model in which
waiting time is discretized to epochs may be a reasonable approximation to the continuous-
time model. At the end of this chapter, we introduce notation relevant to the discrete-time
model and provide the optimal transplantation rate in the discrete scenario.
4.1 The Primal and the Dual Problems
The search of the limiting optimal transplantation rate Ψ is formulated as the following
primal problem. Find Ψ in the admissible control set
C :={Ψ : ∀ s ≥ 0, dΨs = πs−dQs − dπs,π0− = p,
Ψi({s}) ∈ [0, πi(s−)], dΨi(s) ∈ [0,∞) if πi(s−) 6= 0,
dΨi(s) ∈ [0, {πs−dQs}i] if πi(s−) = 0}




is achieved, subject to the constraint
ˆ
[0,T ]




Note here we are using the limiting average life gain from transplantation (2.8) as the
objective. As discussed previously, it is equivalent to using the limiting average total life
(2.6) without affecting the form of the optimal solution.
Solving the above constrained problem directly is difficult. We extend the above problem
to a general problem, where the objective remains the same, while the constraint is replaced
by ˆ
[0,T ]
dΨs · 1n ≤ u, (4.3)
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with u being any positive real number. Define




[0,T ] dΨs · µ̃s if Ψ ∈ C and
´
[0,T ] dΨs · 1n ≤ u,
∞ otherwise.
Also define the Lagrangian, which is the conjugate function of F ,
L(Ψ, c) = inf
u
{F (Ψ, u) + 〈u, c〉}.
Note that for any c ≥ 0 and Ψ ∈ C,
L(Ψ, c) = −
ˆ
[0,T ]




















{F (Ψ, u) + 〈u, c〉}
= inf
u
{ϕ(u) + 〈u, c〉},
which is the conjugate of −ϕ(u). By Rockafellar [1974], the conjugates of both sides are
−(inf
Ψ




L(Ψ, c)− 〈u, c〉} = cocl (ϕ(u)),
where (infΨ L(Ψ, c))∗ is the conjugate of infΨ L(Ψ, c) and cocl (ϕ(u)) is the closure of the
convex hull of ϕ.
The following result shows that given the form of the objective and constraints in our
problem, for any u ∈ (0,∞), the convex closure of ϕ at u is ϕ(u) itself. Consequently, ϕ(u)
CHAPTER 4. SOLUTION TO THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM 41
can be obtained by first solving for the Ψc that maximizes the unconstrained objective
ˆ
[0,T ]
dΨs · µ̃s − c ·
ˆ
[0,T ]
dΨs · 1n (4.4)
for each c over all Ψ in the admissible control set C, and then solving the corresponding c
for the given u that maximizes
inf
Ψ
L(Ψ, c)− 〈u, c〉 = −
ˆ
[0,T ]
dΨcs · µ̃s + c ·
ˆ
[0,T ]
dΨcs · 1n − c · u, (4.5)
in particular, for the upper bound u = ρ/τ in constraint (4.2).
Proposition 4.1.1. ϕ is convex and continuous on any u ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. First we show C is convex. Suppose Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈ C and dΨis = πis−dQs − dπis for i =









and π′0− = p. It is easy to check the inequalities in the definition of C are satisfied for
aΨ1s + (1− a)Ψ2s and π
′ and hence the convexity.
Both the objective (4.1) and the constraint (4.3) are linear functionals of Ψ and hence
are convex and continuous on C. Therefore F (Ψ, u) is convex and closed in (Ψ, u), which
leads to the convexity of ϕ(u) := infΨ{F (Ψ, u)}.
Define the effective domain of ϕ as domϕ = {u : ϕ(u) > −∞}, then any u ∈ (0,∞) is in
the interior of the effective domain of ϕ (int domϕ), as for any Ψ ∈ C, −
´
[0,T ] dΨs · µ̃s ≥
−
´
[0,T ] dΨs · sup{s≥0}{µ̃s} = − sup{s≥0}{µ̃s} · (
´
[0,T ] πs−dQs − dπs), which is bounded
from below by − sup{s≥0}{µs} · (| sup{i∈X}
´ T
0 qi(s)ds| · 1n + 1n) > −∞. By Theorem 8 of
Rockafellar [1974], ϕ is continuous on int domϕ, which contains (0,∞).
4.2 Optimal Transplantation Rate
As shown in the previous section, solving the constrained primal problem is equivalent to
optimizing the penalized objective (4.4) in which c maximizes infΨ L(Ψ, c) − 〈ρ/τ, c〉 and
then find the appropriate c. We are interested in the case where the inequality constraint is




s · 1n = ρ/τ , as otherwise it is implied that
transplantation harms instead of benefits patients’ life.
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The purpose of this section is to characterize the optimal Ψ that maximizes (4.4) given
any value of c. Here we approach the problem by starting from the end of waiting time T : the
optimal Ψ at each s ∈ [0, T ] is solved recursively as a function of the optimal transplantation
rates at waiting times greater than s.
As a preparation for the characterization of the optimal transplantation rate Ψ, or
equivalently, the optimal Λ, we solve the ordinary differential equation (3.9) in the definitions
of Ψ and Λ to explicitly represent π in terms of a product integral of the counterfactual
transition measureQ and the allocation matrix Λ. The product integral is defined as follows
(Gill and Johansen [1990]):
Definition 4.2.1. (Product Integral P)
Suppose real matrix-valued measure Q defined on B([0, T ]) is of finite variation, that is,






where T = {ti : s = t0 < · · · < tn = t} is a partition of the interval (s, t] and the norm
|Q| = maxi
∑
j |Qij |. Let P denote the product integral:
R
(s,t]




(I +Q((ti−1, ti])), (4.6)




dQ. Theorem 1 in Gill and Johansen [1990] shows the existence of
the limit in (4.6) and the multiplicative property of the product integral.




Theorem 4.2.2. (Gill and Johansen [1990])
If α is additive and of finite variation, and µ is defined by
µ((s, t]) = R
(s,t]
(I + dα), (4.7)






Similarly, if µ is multiplicative and µ − I of finite variation, and if α is defined by (4.8),
then (4.7) holds.
Theorem 4 of Gill and Johansen [1990] provides an equivalent representation of (4.7).
Theorem 4.2.3. (Gill and Johansen [1990])
R
(s,t]







α(du1) . . .α(dun).
Applying the above results to the definition of Ψ and Λ provides a product integral
representation of π in terms of Λ and Q:
Proposition 4.2.4. For any 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T ,
πt = πs ·R
(s,t]
(I + dQ)(I − dΛ). (4.9)
Proof. Note that the definition of Λ implies that for any s ≥ 0, πs−(I + dQs)dΛs = dΨs.
Since dΨs = πs−dQs−dπs, dπs = πs−(dQs−dΛs−dQsdΛs). As shown in Theorem 3.1.4,
π is of finite variation, and thus
πt = πs +
ˆ
(s,t]








πu2− · (dQu2 − dΛu2 − dQu2dΛu2)
)
· (dQu1 − dΛu1 − dQu1dΛu1)









α(du1) . . .α(dun)
)
,
where dα(s) = dQs−dΛs−dQsdΛs. Applying Theorem 4.2.3 finishes the proof of (4.9).
Some properties of π that are useful later in solving for the optimal Ψ are given by
multiplicative properties of the product integral:
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Proposition 4.2.5. For all s and t such that 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T ,
πt− = πs ·R
(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛ),
πt− = πs− ·R
[s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛ),
πt = πs− ·R
[s,t]
(I + dQ)(I − dΛ),
πt = πt− ·R
{t}
(I + dQ)(I − dΛ) = πt− · (I −Λ({t})). (4.10)
Proof. (4.10) results from the fact
R
{t}
(I + dQ)(I − dΛ) = (I +Q({t}))(I −Λ({t})) = I −Λ({t}),
as the measure Q is absolutely continuous to the Lebesgue measure. All other equations
can be shown by the multiplicative property of the product integral and (4.10).




(I − dΛ) =
∏
s∈[0,t]
(I −Λ({s})) · R
s∈[0,t],Λ({s})=0
(I − dΛ).
Proof. Since dΛs is diagonal, P[0,t](I − dΛs) is commutative in multiplication. When dΛ is
atomic at s such that for some i, Λi({s}) 6= 0, by the definition (4.6), the product integral
over such atomic points is just the product
∏
s∈[0,t](I −Λ({s})).
With the preparations above, the main result of this section gives the form of the optimal
transplantation rate:
Theorem 4.2.7. (Optimal Solution)
Under any fixed penalty parameter c ≥ 0, the optimal Ψc and Λc that maximizes (4.4)
satisfy
Ψci ({s}) = Λci ({s}) · πi(s−) := I(ϕci (s) > c) · πi(s−) (4.11)
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if πi(s−) > 0, and
dΨci (s)
ds
= Λci ({s}) ·
∑
x∈X




if πi(s−) = 0, for all s ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ X . Here
ϕci (s) =
µ̃i(s)− γci (s+)ηci (s+)
1− γci (s+)
, (4.13)




(I + dQ)(I − dΛc) · dΛct · µ̃t, (4.14)
whose ith element is the expected life gain from transplantation after waiting time s if the




(I + dQ)(I − dΛc) · dΛct · 1n, (4.15)
whose ith element is the cumulative rate of transplantation after waiting time s if the occu-
pancy is concentrated in state i at s− and none is transplanted at s.
Proof. Since
´
[0,T ] dΨs·1n is bounded and non-negative, for each i ∈ X , Ψi is a finite measure






where Ψaci is a finite non-negative measure that is absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure and Ψsi is a finite non-negative measure that is singular to the Lebesgue
measure. By Radon-Nikodym theorem, there exists a unique (up to Lebesgue measure)
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By the definition of singular measures, there exists B ∈ B([0, T ]) such that its Lebesgue
measure
´






Define the value function Vs−(π) as the supremum of the penalized objective function





dΨt · (µ̃t − c · 1n)
}
(4.16)
Where dΨt = πt−dQt−dπt, πs− = π and πt = π ·P[s,t](I+dQ)(I−dΛ) for any t ∈ [s, T ].
By the dynamic programming principle (see, for example, Fleming and Soner [2006]),





















(dΨac(t) + dΨs(t)) · (µ̃t − c · 1n)
}
= 0.




i (u) = 0 for all i ∈ X , and the Radon-Nikodym derivative ψi exists at

















(I + dQ)(I − dΛ) · dΛt · (µ̃t − c1n),
as πt−(I + dQt)dΛt = dΨt and πt− = π · P[s,t)(I + dQ)(I − dΛ) by the multiplicative
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property of π in Proposition 4.2.5, and
dπ
ds
= πs− · qs −ψs.


















0 ≤ πΛ({s}) ≤ π.
We claim that if a function V satisfies (4.17) and (4.18), depending on whether Ψ is
absolutely continuous or singular to Lebesgue measure at s, then V is the value function as
defined in (4.16) for all waiting time s ∈ [0, T ] and distribution π = (π1, . . . , πn) of initial
states. To show this, we first prove V is an upper bound of the value function. Since

















(V (u,πu)− V (u−,πu−)),






t ) · (µ̃t − c · 1n)
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(dΨac(t) + dΨs(t)) · (µ̃t − c · 1n), (4.19)
which verifies that V is an upper bound of the value function.
Now we show the equality can be achieved in (4.19) by providing the solution form of
Ψ leading to V that satisfies (4.17) and (4.18), and conclude that V is indeed the value
function.





{(µ̃s − γc(s+)ηc(s+)− c (1n − γc(s+)) ·ψs
+ (γc(s+)ηc(s+)− cγc(s+)) · π(s−) · q(s)},






















Note the function in the supremum of (4.18) is a linear functional of Λ with coefficient
µ̃s − γc(s+)ηc(s+)− c (1n − γc(s+)),
indicating the optimal Λc at any s ∈ [0, T ] should satisfy
Λc({s}) = I(ϕc(s) > c). (4.21)
Combining the absolutely continuous and singular solutions (4.20) and (4.21) proves the
desired solution form.
Finally, we show {γc(s+)ηc(s+)}i is indeed the expected life gain after waiting time s if
the occupancy is concentrated in state i at s− and none is transplanted at s. Let ei denote
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the n-dimensional vector with the ith element being 1 and all other elements being 0, then
{γc(s+)ηc(s+)}i = ei ·
ˆ
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛc) · dΛct · µ̃t.
Since for any t ∈ (s, T ], ei · P(s,t)(I + dQ)(I − dΛc) is the limiting average occupancy at
waiting time t− if started from full occupancy of state i at s− and if none is transplanted
at s, we have the desired result. The result for {γc(s+)}i can be shown similarly.
4.3 Optimal Transplantation Rate in Discrete Time
The form of the optimal transplantation rate characterized in the previous section relies
on the assumption that model parameters such as the expected residual life µs and the
counterfactual transition kernel dQs are fully specified for all s ∈ [0, T ]. While it is a valid
assumption in the model, estimations of the parameters in practice depend on the quality
of the data. For example, when the data is relatively sparse, it may be difficult to obtain
accurate estimations of µ and Q due to their infinite dimensions. Under such circumstances,
it might be reasonable to consider an approximate model in which waiting time is discretized
to reduce the dimension of unknown parameters.
In this section, we characterize the form of the optimal Λ for a discrete waiting time
model. Here we assume waiting time is discretized into epochs {0, 1, . . . , T} and transitions
and transplantations can only occur at the end of each epoch. In discrete time, the model
depends on the order of transitions and transplantations. As a first approximation, assume
transplantations are always ahead of transitions at the end of each epoch. The form of the
solution for the transplantation-after-transition case can be readily solved along the same
lines. Let Bt denote the counterfactual transition matrix from epoch t to t + 1, then the
counterparts of the limiting average occupancy π and limiting transplantation rate Λ in the
discrete model satisfy
πt+1 = πt(I −Λt)Bt. (4.22)
For convenience, define
Aij(t) := (1− Λi(t)) ·Bij(t),
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then πt+1 = πtAt for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}.
As the counterpart of (3.22), the objective of limiting average total life is
T∑
t=0
(πt1n + πtΛtµt), (4.23)







Use the Lagrange multiplier c ≥ 0 to represent the penalty if
∑
πtΛt1n > ρ/τ , define the
penalized objective function as
T∑
t=0










(πs1n + πsΛsµs − cπsΛs1n)
}
+ c · ρ
τ
.
Proposition 4.3.1. (Discrete Time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equations)
Vt(π) = sup
Λt
(Vt+1(π · (I −Λt)Bt) + ft(π,Λt)), (4.26)
where
ft(π,Λt) = 1nπt + πtΛtµt − cπtΛt1n
is the one-step pay-off function given the current state π and allocation policy Λt.
Proof. The equation follows from the definition of the value function and the dynamic pro-
gramming principle that the optimal allocation rule at time t is such that the sum of one
step reward and the optimal objective function starting from t+ 1 and state π · (I −Λt)Bt
after the one-step transition or allocation is optimal.
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(4.26) can be represented explicitly using the product integral representation (in the
discrete time case, it is just the usual product of matrices), and the form of the solution is
the similar to that of the continuous time model. For the simplicity of expressions, from













Proposition 4.3.2. (Optimal Solution in Discrete Time)
Then for each waiting time t, the optimal solution vector Λt satisfies
Λt = I(µt −
T∑
s=t+1




Λs(µs − c · 1n)) > c · 1n)
= I(µt − lt > c · (1n − pt)), (4.27)









is the expected residual life if the limiting average occupancy is concentrated in state i at









is the probability of being transplanted after t, if the limiting average occupancy is concen-
trated in state i at waiting time t and not transplanted at t.
Proof. Rewrite (4.22) with the product integral representation (without ambiguity, let the
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Substituting into (4.23) gives the objective function (recall that Pt−10 denotes Pt−10 (I −







·(1n + Λt(µt − c · 1n)).
For an arbitrary waiting time t∗, the derivative of this function with respect to πt∗Λt∗ =







) · (1n + Λt(µt − c · 1n)) + (µt∗ − c · 1n),
which indicates the objective function is linear with respect to Λt∗πt∗ and Λt∗ , and to
optimize it, let Λi(t∗) = 1, so that πi(t∗)Λi(t∗) = πi(t∗) if the ith element of the above
vector is positive, and let Λi(t∗) = 0 otherwise, which gives (4.27).
To see li(t∗) is indeed the expected residual life after t∗ if the limiting average occupancy
is concentrated in state i at waiting time t∗ and not transplanted at t∗, as in the continuous-























where πs is the state of the system at s if the limiting average occupancy is concentrated in






Checking the form of objective function (4.23) and the constraint (4.24) leads to the desired
result for li(t) and pi(t).
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An alternative method to show the solution form is to use the Kuhn-Tucker Conditions:
Proposition 4.3.3. The optimal solution that optimizes (4.23) with constraint (4.24) is
Λi(t) = I(µi(t)− {Btλt+1}i > c), (4.28)
where λt = ∂H(t)(πt,Λt,λt+1, c)/∂π is the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian at π = πt,
Λ = Λt, λ = λt+1 and c
H(t)(π,Λ,λ, c) = π1n + πΛ(µt − c · 1n) + (π(I −Λ)Bt)λ. (4.29)
Proof. (4.22) can be taken as sharp constraints. Since there are T constraints in total, insert










(πt(I −Λt)Bt − πt+1)λt+1. (4.30)
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the maximum principle is











Λt = argmax H(t)(πt,Λt,λt+1, c). (4.31)
Solving the last equation of (4.31), since letting Ψt = πtΛt gives
H(t)(πt,Λt,λt+1, c) = πt(1n +Btλt+1) + Ψt(µt − c1n −Btλt+1),
to maximize H(t), it suffices to let Ψi(t) = πi(t) if µi(t)− {Btλt+1}i > c and let Ψi(t) = 0
otherwise, which proves the desired solution.
A natural question is whether the solution from product integral representation and the
solution obtained by using Kuhn-Tucker conditions are equivalent. The equivalence is shown
in the following result, moreover, we explain practical meanings of the Lagrange multipliers
λt.
Proposition 4.3.4. Solutions (4.27) and (4.28) are equivalent, and
{Btλt+1,}i = li(t)− c · pi(t).
Proof. By (4.31), it suffices to prove
Btλt+1 = Bt ·
∂
∂π






= (1n + Λt+1µt+1 − c ·Λt+1) + (I −Λt+1)Bt+1 · λt+2
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which is the desired result.
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Chapter 5
The Proposed Allocation Strategy
Results in the previous section delineate the form of the optimal transplantation rate Ψ. If
we can find a fair allocation rule such that the corresponding limiting transplantation rate
has the desired form, then allocating organs to patients in the waiting list according to the
allocation rule will indeed lead to the maximal long-term average total life (or long-term
average life gain) as calendar time increases.








Therefore, given the optimal transplantation rate Ψ, the goal (with slight abuse of nota-




i,n+1(s)/N[0,l] approaches dΨi(s) as
calendar time increases.
However, it is not guaranteed such allocation rules exist. The reason is that even if the
form of dΨi(s) indicates all of the patients in state i at waiting time s should be transplanted,
when an organ is available for transplantation, such patients may not exist in the waiting
list. Since the organ can only be preserved for a limited time before losing its functionality,
the transplantation cannot be delayed for patients in the optimal state and waiting time to
appear. One of the patients available in the waiting list, though in suboptimal states and
waiting times, must receive the transplantation. Essentially, not all practical constraints on
the transplantation rate are characterized by constraint (3.25) and Proposition 3.4.2. As a
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consequence, the value of the objective corresponding to the optimal Ψ, though is indeed
an upper bound of the limiting average life, may not be achievable by any fair allocation
rules in practice.
In this chapter, we propose a fair allocation strategy motivated by the form of the optimal
transplantation rate. The idea is to use the penalty parameter c in the unconstrained
problem at which the solved transplantation rates at waiting time and state combinations
are non-zero to prioritize patients’ states and waiting times. In what follows, we will describe
the proposed allocation strategy and certain monotonicity properties on which its validity
relies, then show the monotonicity properties hold.
5.1 Priority Ranking for Transplantation
Since the penalty parameter c ≥ 0 is associated with the constraint (3.25) on the limiting
















it can be interpreted as the penalty for over-using the available resource of organs. As c
decreases, the penalty becomes more lenient. A natural property would be as c decreases,
the average proportion of transplanted patients increases, as more allocations are allowed.
Moreover, as c decreases, the limiting average total life (or life gain) should increase, as more
organs are provided to prolong life.
For each value of c ≥ 0, define corresponding feasible set
Sc := {(i, s) : i ∈ X , s ∈ [0, T ],Λci (s) > 0}, (5.1)
of pairs of states and waiting times that are assigned non-zero transplantation rate in the
optimal solution under c, where Λc is characterized in Theorem 4.2.7 (or Proposition 4.3.2
and 4.3.3 in the discrete-time model). If the feasible set is also monotone with respect to c,
that is,
Sc1 ⊂ Sc2 if c1 > c2, (5.2)
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which is equivalent to for any s ∈ [0, T ]
dΛc1s ≤ dΛc2s if c1 > c2,
then starting from a large positive number c0 such that Sc0 = ∅, by decreasing c, a full order
ranking of pairs of states and waiting times can be obtained by comparing the order of each
pair entering the feasible set Sc, or equivalently, by comparing the maximal c such that the
pair is in Sc.
Once the rank of state and waiting time pairs is determined, whenever an organ is
retrieved, the patient with the highest rank among all patients in the current waiting list is
selected for transplantation. The resulting limiting average total life is expected to be close to
the upper bound, as in effect patients are ranked according to their potential contributions
to the limiting average life considering the limited availability of organs. This allocation
strategy satisfies the fairness requirement, as the allocation decisions are fully determined
given states and waiting times of patients in the current list, and are invariant to calendar
time and patient index.
5.2 Proof of the Monotonicities
To show the proposed allocation strategy is valid, we prove the conjectured monotonicity
properties hold. First, we show the monotonicities for the limiting proportion of transplanted







t1n is non-decreasing when c decreases.














(H(t)(πt,Λt,λt+1, c)− πtλt) + π0λ0, (5.3)
where H(t) is the Hamiltonian defined in (4.29). Note that comparing to (4.30) there is no
term ρ/τ in (5.3). Also, note here c is fixed constant, instead of a parameter to be optimized
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over, and L̃c is a function of c. To optimize L̃, all partial derivatives of L̃ with respect to
πt, Λt and λt must be zero, which leads to principles:





Λt = argmax H(t)(πt,Λt,λt+1, c). (5.4)
Note (5.4) is just (4.31) without the constraint
∑T
t=0 πtΛt1n = ρ/τ .
We need to show that solutions (π1t ,Λ
1
t ) and (π2t ,Λ
2











t1n if c1 > c2. (5.5)
Since (πjt ,Λ
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and hence desired monotonicity (5.5) as c1 > c2.
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tµt) is non-decreasing as c
decreases.








By the fact L̃c2(π1t ,Λ
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We state the following results for the continuous-time model without proofs, as the


















sµs is non-decreasing as c decreases.
Now we show the monotonicity (5.2) of the allocable set. First, for the continuous-time
model:
Theorem 5.2.5. (Monotonicity of the Allocation Rule)
Suppose ϕcj satisfy the characterization (4.13) of the optimal transplantation rate under
{cj : j = 1, 2}, then for all s ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ X ,
I(ϕc1i (s) > c1) ≤ I(ϕ
c2
i (s) > c2), if c1 > c2. (5.6)
Proof. By (4.13), it suffices to show that for all s ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ X ,
{µ̃s − c11n}i > {γc1(s+)ηc1(s+)− c1γc1(s+)}i
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is a sufficient condition for
{µ̃s − c21n}i > {γc2(s+)ηc2(s+)− c2γc2(s+)}i,
where {·}i indicates the ith element of the vector, and γc1(s+) and ηc1(s+) are defined as
in (4.14) and (4.15). Note for j = 1, 2,




(I + dQ)(I − dΛcj ) · dΛcj (t) · (µ̃t − cj · 1n),
where {Λcj (t) : t ∈ (s, T ]} are characterized in (4.11) and (4.12).
A key observation is that for any s ∈ [0, T ], the form of {Λcj (t) : t ∈ (s, T ]} is independent
of the initial condition πs. Therefore for any i ∈ X and s ∈ [0, T ], {Λcj (t) : t ∈ (s, T ]} also
maximizes the objective under penalty parameter cj as if only waiting time greater than s










(I + dQ)(I − dΛc2) · dΛc2(t) · (µ̃t − c1 · 1n).
Subtracting {γc2(s+)ηc2(s+)− c2γc2(s+)}i from both sides gives




(I + dQ)(I − dΛc2) · dΛc2(t) · (c2 · 1n − c1 · 1n).
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(I + dQ)(I − dΛc2) · dΛc2(t) · 1n ≤ 1,
therefore
γc1(s+)ηc1(s+) + c1(1n − γc1(s+)) ≥ γc2(s+)ηc2(s+) + c2(1n − γc2(s+)), (5.7)
and hence whenever
{µ̃s − c11n}i > {γc1(s+)ηc1(s+)− c1γc1(s+)}i,
we must have
{µ̃s − c21n}i > {γc2(s+)ηc2(s+)− c2γc2(s+)}i.




t if c1 > c2 (5.8)
where {Λcit : t = 0, . . . T} are characterized in (4.27) and (4.28).
Proof. We prove (5.8) with induction. Since ΛciT = I(µT > ci1n), (5.8) is true for t = T .
Now assume the monotonicity is true for waiting time t, by the form of optimal solution
(4.28),
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Now we want to prove for waiting time t− 1,
Λc1t−1 ≤ Λ
c2
t−1 if c1 > c2,
which is true if for any i ∈ X ,
µt−1,i − c1 > {lc1t−1 − c1p
c1






µt−1,i − c1 > {lc1t−1 − c1p
c1
t−1}i,
we need to show that









H(t)(πt,Λt,λt+1, cj) = 1n +Btλ
cj
t+1 + (µt −Btλ
cj
t+1 − cj) · I(µt −Btλ
cj
t+1 > cj),
which is equivalent to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
{lcjt−1 − cjp
cj




t ) ∨ (µt − cj1n)].
Since the first part on the right side is free of the penalty parameter cj , to show µt−1,i−c2 >
{lc2t−1 − c2p
c2
t−1}i, it suffices to show
eiBt−1 · [(lc1t − c1p
c1




t ) ∨ (µt − c21n)] + c2,
which is condition (5.7) proved in the continuous-time model. The rest of the proof follows
the proof of Theorem 5.2.5.
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Chapter 6
Comparison of Allocation Strategies
In this chapter, we consider the application of the proposed allocation strategy in the context
of realistic lung transplant waiting lists, and evaluate the proposed strategy and the Lung
Allocation Score (LAS) system currently used by United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS)
with results of simulation studies.
The data used are the waiting list, transplant and follow-up UNOS Standard Transplant
Analysis and Research files for heart, lung, and simultaneous heart-lung registrations and
transplants that were listed or performed in the United States and reported to the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) from October 1, 1987 to December 31,
2012. Only patients waiting for lungs and were at least 12 years of age are considered, as
before June 11, 2013, only patients at least 12 years of age received priority for deceased
donor lung offers based on the LAS. There were 16,049 such patients registered in the time
period, with 129,881 medical records containing medical measurements updated sporadically
at different times for different patients during their tenure on the waiting list. Among the
16,049 candidates, 64.6% received transplantation, 18.4% died while waiting in the list, and
the remaining were still waiting at the end of the study period or censored by loss of follow-
up. Among patients who received transplantation, 37.8% died and 62.2% were still alive at
the end of the study period or were censored due to loss of follow-up.
Parameters estimated from the data include the intensity of the patient arrival process τ ,
the intensity of the organ arrival process ρ, the health states X , the counterfactual transition
kernel Q, the distribution {P (X(0) = xi) : i = 1, . . . , n} of the initial state upon arrival, the
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in-waiting list and post-transplant waiting time and health state specific hazards for death,
and the expected post-transplantation residual life µs(x) given the state x and waiting time
s at the point of transplantation. In order to reduce computation time in the simulations and
to obtain enough patient history records for the estimation of the transition probabilities,
time is discretized into periods of 90 days.
A multi-stage strategy was used to estimate the parameters. First, a time-dependent
covariates proportional hazard regression is fitted to estimate the time-on-waiting-list specific
hazard for death. Covariates in the proportional hazard regression are those used in the in-
waiting-list survival calculation in the LAS system by UNOS, whenever they are available
in the data. Conditioning on the covariates, the potential hazard for death while waiting
is invariant to the allocation decisions, and thus the censoring due to organ allocations can
be treated as censoring at random. Moreover, using the same covariates as in the LAS
calculation for the proposed allocation strategy prevents potential advantage gained from
better covariate selections in estimating the hazard, so that the LAS and the proposed
strategy can be compared fairly. See Table A.1 in the appendix for the list of covariates and
coefficient estimates.
The linear combination of predictors
∑






to reflect the survival function and the expected residual life in the waiting list. Then the
transformed linear combination is discretized into a three-level state variable Swl.
Second, a proportional hazard regression is used to estimate the hazard for post-transplant
death. Covariates in the proportional hazard regression are those used in the post-transplant
survival calculation in the LAS system, whenever available in the data. See Table A.2 in
the appendix for the list of covariates and coefficient estimates.
The linear combination of predictors of each patient in the proportional hazard regression
is also transformed double-exponentially to reflect the expected post-transplantation life
given the time-of-transplant specific characteristics of patients, and discretized into a three-
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level state variable Sµ.
Third, patients’ health states are characterized in terms of the pair (Swl, Sµ), that is, the
pair of states related to the in-waiting-list and post-transplantation survivals. See Figure
A.3 in the appendix for the reference table of health states defined as interactions of Swl
and Sµ.
In estimating the transition probabilities of patients’ health states, due to the sparsity




= aij + dj · s
to estimate the transition probabilities of Swl and Sµ separately, where s is the time period
and i is the state selected to be the baseline. The counterfactual transition probabilities of
the pair (Swl, Sµ) are calculated as products of the transition probabilities of the components.
Fourth, the distribution of initial states {P (X(0) = i) : i = 1, . . . , n} is estimated with
the proportion of patients arrived in each state.
Fifth, proportional hazard regressions are used to estimate the hazard for in-waiting-
list death and the matrix µ of post-transplantation life expectancy corresponding to each
combination of waiting time and state.
In the data, the first transplantation date was May 5, 2005, although the first patient
arrival date was Jan 22, 1993. To estimate the organ arrival rate ρ and the patient arrival
rate τ more precisely, we use mean numbers of patient arrivals and organ arrivals per 45-day
period after year 2006 as our estimates ρ̂ = 156, τ̂ = 259.
Given parameters estimated using methods described above, for a fixed value of the
penalty parameter c, whether a combination of waiting time and state is allocable is calcu-
lated as in (4.27) and (4.28). Based on the monotonicity of the proposed allocation rule,
a full order ranking of transplant priorities for combinations of waiting times and states is
obtained using the order of their appearances in the allocable set as c decreases.
Two LAS-type allocation systems are considered. First, the LAS currently used by the
UNOS is LAS = 100 · (PTAUC− 2 ·WLAUC+ 730)/1095, where WLAUC is the estimated
in-waiting list life expectancy during an additional year and PTAUC is the estimated post-
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transplant life expectancy during the first year, given the patient’s current state. Patients
with higher LAS have higher priorities of transplantation.
Observing from the data that patients’ in-waiting-list and post-transplantation life are
usually much longer than one year, we provide a refined LAS, which is the difference between
two times of the estimated post-transplant life expectancy and the estimated in-waiting list
life expectancy without the one year constraint. Rankings of transplantation priorities for all
combinations of waiting times and states are calculated for both LAS systems. See Figures
6.1 and 6.2 below for a comparison between rankings with the proposed allocation strategy
and the LAS systems, where blue indicates higher priority for transplantation, while red
indicates lower priority.
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Figure 6.1: Proposed strategy (left) vs. LAS (right) in 90-day periods
x: states defined by in-waiting-list residual life; y: states by post-transplant residual life
(higher index indicates longer estimated life)
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Figure 6.2: Refined LAS (left) vs. LAS (right) in 90-day periods
x: states defined by in-waiting-list residual life; y: states by post-transplant residual life
(higher index indicates longer estimated life)
Patient arrivals according to a homogeneous Poisson process with the estimated inten-
sity τ̂ and organ arrivals according to a homogeneous Poisson process with the estimated
intensity ρ̂ are simulated independently. At the end of each waiting time period, coun-
terfactual transitions in patients’ health states are simulated with the estimated transition
probabilities. Using priority rankings of the proposed allocation strategy and the two LAS
systems, organs, whenever available, are allocated to patients with the highest ranked pairs
of waiting times and states in the current waiting list. Patients who are not selected for
transplants remain on the waiting list and are open to future counterfactual transitions and
potential allocations. At the end of the simulation, the average total life for patients under
each of the allocation strategies is recorded in days.
See Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3 for the means and standard deviations of results of ten
independent simulations, in which we compare the outcomes under the proposed allocation
strategy and the LAS systems. In addition, we compare them with outcomes under a purely
random allocation strategy in which patients are chosen for transplantation randomly, and
outcomes under the presumably worst strategy whose ranking of priority is the opposite
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of the proposed allocation strategy. Outcomes of all strategies are compared to the upper
bound of average patient total life in the model.
Average Total Life
(SD)




Upper Bound 1,853 NA NA
Optimal 1,820 (22.3) 150 (7.8) 1,670 (32.4)
LAS 1,705 (19.0) 206 (7.4) 1,499 (25.5)
Refined LAS 1,707 (19.4) 203 (7.2) 1,503 (25.6)
Random Strategy 1,573 (60.2) 167 (22.3) 1,407 (71.3)
Worst Strategy 1,416 (19.4) 162 (9.9) 1,255 (28.4)




























































Figure 6.3: Simulation Results
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Chapter 7
Discussion
We have presented an approach to modeling the lung transplantation waiting list and com-
paring allocation rules. Here patient and organ arrivals are modeled as independent homoge-
neous Poisson processes, and counterfactual patient health status trajectories absent trans-
plantation are modeled as independent and identically distributed inhomogeneous Markov
processes. Patients’ expected post-transplantation residual life depends on both the health
state at the time of transplantation and the time waited for transplantation. The model set-
ting here is capable of capturing the randomness in patient and organ arrivals and complex
dynamics of patients’ health characteristics and their effect on life outcomes. In practice,
the researchers and/or policy makers can always expand the state space of patient health
status so that trajectories of the transitions of health states are indeed Markov. For ex-
ample, previous medical records of patients can be included if they are believed to contain
important information for predicting future transitions.
Allocation rules are modeled as index sequences of transplanted patients. Only fair
allocation rules are considered in the comparison. Under fair allocation rules, the choice
of patients for transplantations are decided by patients’ health states and waiting times
at the time of organ arrival and a random variable that is conditionally independent of
patients’ past and future states and survivals. Allocation probabilities are also required
to be invariant to patient index and calendar time. This definition of fairness has two
implications: first, unrealistic rules that can predict patients’ future states and survivals
are not considered; second, given patients’ health states and waiting times, the allocation
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decisions are independent of other factors. Therefore the definition of fairness here implicitly
addresses the equity issue in organ allocations.
It is shown each fair allocation rule has a corresponding limiting transplantation rate.
Under a fair allocation rule, the average rate of transplantation to patients in any state and
waiting time converges to the corresponding transplantation rate as calendar time increases.
The limiting transplantation rate satisfies certain constraints to reflect the scarcity of organs.
The main constraint is that the average proportion of transplanted patients in the limit is
bounded by the ratio of organ arrivals to that of patient arrivals. The limiting average
total life (or equivalently, the limiting average life gain from transplantation), represented in
terms of the transplantation rate, is used as the standard in comparing fair allocation rules.
The optimal transplantation rate subject to the constraints is characterized recursively
with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. Then a fair allocation strategy is developed
based on the form and monotonicity properties of the optimal transplantation rate. The
allocation strategy is to use the penalty parameter c associated with the constraint on
the average proportion of transplanted patients as an index to prioritize patients’ states
and waiting times. The index c is related to the Gittins Index (Bertsimas and Niño-Mora
[2000]). Allocating resources using Gittins index leads to optimal or asymptotically optimal
objectives in problems where subjects remain static if not selected for allocations (Weber
[1992], Whittle [1980], Whittle [1988]) and in settings where the rates of patient and organ
arrivals tend to infinity. In restless bandits problems in which all subjects are constantly
in transitions, including the problem studied here, though there are sufficient conditions
for Gittins Index to be optimal (Bertsimas and Niño-Mora [1996], Niño-Mora [2001]), the
optimality is not guaranteed in general.
Simulation studies show it may be possible to improve the Lung Allocation Score (LAS)
currently used by UNOS and increase the average total life by as much as 7%. Results
provided here are provisional, a deeper understanding of the lung allocation procedure and
the optimal allocation strategy requires further effort. As discussed previously, there may
be a gap between the objective using the proposed strategy and the practical upper bound
of the objective. The gap may be a result of the lack of patients in optimal states and
waiting times when organs are available, which may stem from the fact the constraints in
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the optimization problem do not cover all practical confinements on the allocations. Issues
related to donor-recipient matching, cross-region transplantation, or other practical aspects
in lung transplantation may also require further constraints to be imposed in formulating
the optimal transplantation rate and developing allocation strategies.
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Appendix A
Tables and Graphs
Table A.1: Coefficient Estimates for Time-on-Waiting-List Hazard for Death
Covariate Coefficient p-value
Initial Age 0.026 2.62× 10−9 (***)
Body mass index (BMI;
kg/m2)
0.119 × (20 - BMI) for
BMI less than 20 kg/m2
0.001 (**)






Creatinine (serum, mg/dL) 0.438 if at least 18 years
of age
2.11× 10−6 (***)
Diagnosis Group A 0 NA
Diagnosis Group B 1.500 9.44× 10−6 (***)
Diagnosis Group C 0.958 3.51× 10−5 (***)
Diagnosis Group D 0.997 5.93× 10−10 (***)
Eisenmenger’s syndrome -0.485 0.510
Lymphangioleiomyomatosis -1.367 0.174
Obliterative bronchiolitis -1.548 0.123
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Pulmonary fibrosis, not idio-
pathic
0.012 0.947
Sarcoidosis with PA mean
pressure greater than 30 mm
Hg
-0.412 0.087 (.)
Sarcoidosis with PA mean
pressure of 30 mm Hg or less
0.403 0.178
Forced vital capacity (FVC) -0.225 0.0004 (***)
Functional Status -0.480 if no assistance
needed with activities of
daily living
0.021 (*)
Oxygen needed to maintain
adequate oxygen saturation
(80% or greater) at rest
(L/min)
0.085 for Group B, 0.100
for Groups A, C, and D
0.014 (*)
< 2× 10−16 (***)
PCO2 (mm Hg): current 0.007 if PCO2 is at least
40 mm Hg
0.0001 (***)
Pulmonary artery (PA) sys-
tolic pressure (10 mm Hg) at
rest, prior to any exercise
0.008 for Group A if the
PA systolic pressure is
greater than 40 mm Hg,
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Six minute walk distance
(feet) obtained while the can-
didate is receiving supplemen-
tal oxygen required to main-
tain an oxygen saturation of
88% or greater at rest. In-
crease in supplemental oxygen
during this test is at the dis-
cretion of the center perform-
ing the test.
-0.001 < 2× 10−16 (***)
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Table A.2: Coefficient Estimates for Post-Transplantation Hazard for Death
Covariate Coefficient p-value
Initial Age 0.005 × (age − 45) if
greater than 45 years of
age
9.57× 10−7 (***)
Body mass index (BMI;
kg/m2)
0.052 × (20 − BMI) for
BMI less than 20 kg/m2
0.0006 (***)






Creatinine (serum, mg/dL) 0.243 if at least 18 years
of age
3.97× 10−5 (***)
Diagnosis Group A 0 NA
Diagnosis Group B 0.318 0.070 (.)
Diagnosis Group C 0.167 0.049 (*)
Diagnosis Group D 0.119 0.005 (**)
Bronchiectasis -0.113 0.910
Eisenmenger’s syndrome 0.788 0.271
Lymphangioleiomyomatosis -0.605 0.058 (.)
Obliterative bronchiolitis 0.071 0.731
Pulmonary fibrosis, not idio-
pathic
-0.135 0.107
Sarcoidosis with PA mean
pressure greater than 30 mm
Hg
-0.259 0.048 (*)
Sarcoidosis with PA mean
pressure of 30 mm Hg or less
-0.046 0.795
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Functional Status -0.140 if no assistance
needed with activities of
daily living
0.314
Oxygen needed to maintain
adequate oxygen saturation
(80% or greater) at rest
(L/min)
-0.010 for Group B
0.009 for Groups A, C,
and D
0.734, 0.122
Six minute walk distance
(feet) obtained while the can-
didate is receiving supplemen-
tal oxygen required to main-
tain an oxygen saturation of
88% or greater at rest. In-
crease in supplemental oxygen
during this test is at the dis-





walked is at least 1200
feet
2.05× 10−11 (***)
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Table A.3: Definition of Patients’ Health States in Terms of (Swl, Sµ)
State Swl Sµ State Swl Sµ State Swl Sµ
1 1 1 4 2 1 7 3 1
2 1 2 5 2 2 8 3 2
3 1 3 6 2 3 9 3 3
(Higher index in Swl and Sµ corresponds to longer estimated in-waiting-list and post-
transplantation life, respectively.)
Figure A.1: The Proposed Strategy










Optimal Figure A.2: The LAS











Figure A.3: The Refined LAS














X-axis: waiting time periods
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Appendix B
Properties of the Waiting List Process
The following section is optional and provides an alternative proof of the convergence of the
limiting average occupancy π. The proof is based on the fact that the waiting list process
is a positive Harris recurrent piecewise deterministic Markov processes, so that the time
average of a functional of the process converges to its expected value with respect to the
invariant measure.
To proceed, we first define two extended versions of the waiting list process:
Definition B.0.7. (The Extended Waiting List Processes)
For any pair of waiting time s ∈ [0, T ] and state i ∈ X\{0}, define
W
(s,i)




t := {(t− Tk, X̃(k)(t− Tk), I(t− Tk ≥ s, X̃(k)(s−) = i)) : t− Tk ∈ [0, T )}. (B.2)
Without loss of generality, also denote the empty state of both processes by w0.
Remark. Both {W (s,i)t : t ≥ 0} and {W
(s−,i)
t : t ≥ 0} are càdlàg given the càdlàg nature of
the indicator functions in the definition.
In what follows, we prove that the extended waiting list processes W (s,i)t and W
(s−,i)
t are
piecewise deterministic Markov processes (PDMP). The definition of PDMP are as follows
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(Davis [1984], Dempster and Ye [1992, 1995]). Essentially, such processes are characterized
by random Markov jumps and deterministic trajectories between jumps.
Definition B.0.8. (Piecewise Deterministic Markov Process)
A piecewise deterministic process {xt = (νt, ζt) : t ≥ 0} defined on the state space (E, E)
is characterized by the following definitions:
Let K be a countable set and d : K → N be a given function, for each ν ∈ K, Mν is an
open subset of Rd(ν). Then
E = ∪ν∈KMν = {(ν, ζ) : ν ∈ K, ζ ∈Mν}.
Let E denote the following class of measurable sets in E:
E = {∪ν∈KAν : Aν ∈Mν},
whereMν denotes the Borel sets of Mν . Then (E , E) is a Borel space.
The probability law of {xt} is determined by the following objects:
1. Vector fields {Xν : ν ∈ K},
2. A measurable jump rate λ : E → R+,
3. A transition measure Q : E × (E ∪ Γ∗)→ [0, 1] (Γ∗ is defined below).
The vector fields Xν are supposed to be such that for each z ∈Mν , there is a unique integral




f(ζ(t, z)) = Xf(ζ(t, z))
for all smooth f and t ≥ 0, under the initial condition
ζ(0, z) = z.
Further, it is supposed that the Xν are conservative, i.e., the integral curves are defined for
all t > 0 (no explosions).
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We denote by ∂Mν the boundary of Mν and by ∂∗Mν those boundary points at which
integral curves of Mν exit from Mν , i.e.
∂∗Mν = {z ∈ ∂Mν : φν(t, ζ) = z for some (t, ζ) ∈ R+ ×Mν},
and
Γ∗ = ∪ν∈K∂∗Mν .
With the convention inf{∅} =∞, define the boundary hitting time for x = (ν, ζ):
t∗(x) = inf{t > 0 : φν(t, ζ) ∈ ∂∗Mν}.
As regards the jump rate λ, suppose that for each x = (ν, ζ) ∈ E, there exists ε > 0 such
that that the function s→ λ(ν, φν(s, ζ)) is integrable for s ∈ [0, ε).
The transition measure Q(A;x) is a measurable function of x for each fixed A ∈ E and
x ∈ E ∪ Γ∗ and is a probability measure on (E, E) for each x ∈ E.
The process {xt = (νt, ζt) : t ≥ 0} is constructed from any initial state x = (n, z) ∈ E in
the following way:





0 λ(n, φn(s, z)) ds), t < t
∗(x),
0, t ≥ t∗(x).
Select the first jumping time as a random variable Θ1 such that P (Θ1 > t) = S(t). Now se-
lect, independently, anE-valued random variable (N,Z) having distributionQ(·; (n, φn(Θ1, z))).
The trajectory of xt for t ≤ Θ1 is given by
xt = (νt, ζt) =

(n, φn(t, z)), t < Θ1
(N,Z), t = Θ1.
In particular, xΘ1− = (n, φn(t, z)) and the state of the process at Θ1 is decided in the
same way as in the construction of a continuous Markov process from a Markov chain with
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transition matrix Q. Starting from xΘ1 , we use above steps for the next jumping time Θ2
by defining the distribution of Θ2 − Θ1 with the jump rate λ, and the distribution of the
state xΘ2 with the transition measure Q. By iterating this procedure we have a well defined
piecewise deterministic trajectory {xt : t ≥ 0} with jumping times Θ1,Θ2, . . . . Under the
stated condition on λ, Θ1 > 0 and Θi −Θi−1 > 0 for each i with probability one.





be the number of jumps in [0, t], then for all t ≥ 0,
E(Nt) <∞.
which also implies that Θi →∞ as i→∞ with probability one.
Proposition B.0.9. A piecewise deterministic process {xt = (νt, ζt) : t ≥ 0} is strong
Markov.
Proof. See Davis [1984].
Now we show that with any fair allocation rule, the extended waiting list processes are
indeed PDMP and are therefore strong Markov. The main idea of the proof is to find
elements Xν , λ, Q, etc. such thatW (s,i)t andW
(s−,i)
t can be represented with these elements
as in the constructing of a PDMP in its definition.
Theorem B.0.10. (Extended Waiting List Processes as PDMP)
With any fair allocation sequence J = {J1, J2, . . . }, the corresponding extended waiting
list processes {W (s,i)t , t ≥ 0} and {W
(s−,i)
t , t ≥ 0} defined on the filtration {Ft : t ≥ 0} are
càdlàg piecewise deterministic Markov processes (PDMP).
Proof. First, note that the state space of both {W (s,i)t , t ≥ 0} and {W
(s−,i)
t , t ≥ 0} can be
represented as
W0 := {(ν, ζ) : ν ∈ K, ζ ∈Mν}, (B.3)
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whereK = ∪∞d=0(X0×{0, 1})d is the countable space containing all finite dimensional vectors
of possible values of
νt = {(X̃(k)(t− Tk), I(t− Tk ≥ s, X̃(k)(s) = i)) : t− Tk ∈ [0, T )}
for W (s,i)t , or
νt = {(X̃(k)(t− Tk), I(t− Tk ≥ s, X̃(k)(s−) = i)) : t− Tk ∈ [0, T )}
for W (s−,i)t , including the zero-dimensional empty state w0, and Mν = [0, T )d(ν) is the space
of corresponding waiting times of patients in the waiting list
ζt = {t− Tk : t− Tk ∈ [0, T )},
where d(ν) is the dimension of ν.
Second, in both processes {W (s,i)t , t ≥ 0} and {W
(s−,i)
t , t ≥ 0}, jumps occur if and only
if a new patient arrives, or, if the waiting list is not empty, there is any transition in an
existing patient’s state, or a patient is transplanted, or if the waiting time of a patient hits
{s, T} and the condition of the indicator function is satisfied such that the value of the
indicator function changes from zero to one. In between these jumping times, the waiting
time component ζt of both processes increase linearly with the calendar time. Let
φν(t, z) = z + t · 1d(ν), (B.4)
where 1d(ν) is the vector of length d(ν) with all elements being 1, then in between jumping





















(z), ν 6= w0,
0, ν = w0.
(B.5)
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By the chain rule of differentiation,
∂
∂t
f(ζ(t, z)) = Xf(ζ(t, z))
for all smooth f and t ≥ 0.
Third, for each ν ∈ K, the boundary ∂Mν of Mν is the set of d(ν) dimensional vectors
in which one element is in {s, T} and the rest is in [0, s) ∪ (s, T ), and it is equal to the
achievable boundary
∂∗Mν = {z ∈ ∂Mν : φν(t, ζ) = z for some (t, ζ) ∈ R+ ×Mν},
given the form of φν(t, ζ) in (B.4). Denote
Γ∗ = ∪ν∈K∂∗Mν .
The boundary hitting time for (ν, ζ) ∈W is
t∗(x) = inf{t > 0 : φν(t, ζ) ∈ ∂∗Mν} = min
i
{(T − ζi) ∧ (s− ζi)},
where ζi is the ith element of the waiting time component ζ.
Fourth, given W (s,i)t = w (or W
(s−,i)
t = w), probabilities of a jump occurs in calendar
time [t, t+dt) due to patient arrivals, transplantations or transitions are τdt, ρdt ·I(w 6= w0)
and
∑
j:(kj ,zj)∈w qkj (zj)dt, respectively, where kj is the state component X̃(zj) of the jth
element in w and qkj (zj) =
∑
l 6=kj qkj ,l(zj) is a patient’s total transition rate from state kj
at waiting time at zj . By the independence between organ arrivals, patient arrivals and
patient transitions, the jump rate of W (s,i)t and W
(s−,i)
t at w is




Fifth, givenW (s,i) jumps at calendar time t andW (s,i)t− = w, suppose there are d patients
in w before the jump, and their states and waiting times at t− are {(kj , zj) : j = 1, . . . , d}
where kj ∈ X0 × {0, 1} and zj ∈ [0, T ), then W (s,i)t follows a multinomial distribution on
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possible outcomes after a transition or a transplantation, or a patient arrival, or one of the
current patients’ waiting times hits the boundary {s, T}. The probability of the jump is due






I(zj /∈ {s, T}),






I(zj /∈ {s, T}),






I(zj /∈ {s, T}),




I(zj = s) ·
qkj ,i(zj)
qkj (zj)
+ I(zj = T )
]
.
Given the jump is due to a patient arrival, the conditional probability of newly arrived
patient is in state i is pi, which is independent of the jumping time. Given the jump is
due to an organ allocation, by the definition of the fair allocation sequence, the conditional




Therefore, there exists a transition kernelQ(·; ·) such that {W (s,i)t , t ≥ 0} and {W
(s−,i)
t , t ≥
0} can be represented by the following construction of process xt: from any initial state (n, z):





0 λ(n, φn(s, z)) ds), t < t
∗(x)
0, t ≥ t∗(x)
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The trajectory of xt for t ≤ Θ1 is given by
xt = (νt, ζt) =

(n, φn(t, z)), t < Θ1
(N,Z), t = Θ1
where random variable (N,Z) has distribution Q(·; (n, φn(Θ1, z))) and is independent of Θ1.
Θ2,Θ3, . . . and {xt : t > Θ1} are constructed by repeating these steps as in the definition
of piecewise deterministic Markov processes.
The no-explosion condition is satisfied since the patient and organ arrivals have finite
intensity and patient transitions have finite total transition rate. Therefore with any fair
allocation rule, {Wt, t ≥ 0} is a càdlàg piecewise deterministic Markov process.
Next we show the existence of finite invariant measures of the extended waiting list
processes. The usual recurrence condition is not applicable since the state space of both
processes is uncountable. Here we use convergence results for Harris recurrent general space
Markov processes. The following definitions and theorems are from Meyn and Tweedie
[1993b,a], Dai [1995] and Kaspi and Mandelbaum [1994]:
Definition B.0.11. (Harris Recurrence)
Let {Xt : t ≥ 0} be a strong Markov process on state space (X,B(X)) with transition
semi-group P t. Let {Px : x ∈ X} be the probability measure induced by the process with
initial condition X(0) = x. For any A ∈ B(X), let τA = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ A}. The process
{Xt : t ≥ 0} is Harris recurrent if there exists some σ-finite measure ψ on (X,B(X)),
such that whenever ψ(A) > 0, Px(τA <∞) = 1, ∀x ∈ X.
Proposition B.0.12. (Existence of Finite Invariant Measure)
If a càdlàg piecewise deterministic Markov process {Xt : t ≥ 0} is Harris recurrent, then
it has a unique (up to constant multiples) invariant measure π.
Proof. See Getoor [1980], Azema et al. [1967] and Kaspi and Mandelbaum [1994].
If the invariant measure π is finite, it can be normalized to be a probability measure. In
this case {Wt, t ≥ 0} is called positive Harris recurrent.
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A sufficient condition for positive Harris recurrence involves the definition of small sets
(c.f. Dai and Meyn [1995]).
Definition B.0.13. A set C ∈ B(X) is called small or petite if there exists t > 0, a
probability measure ν on B(X) and δ > 0 such that
P t(x,A) ≥ δν(A),
for any x ∈ C and A ∈ B(X), where P t(x,A) = Px(X(t) ∈ A).
The following sufficient condition for positive Harris recurrence is from Dai [1995], Meyn
and Tweedie [1993b,a]:





where τC(δ) = inf{t ≥ δ : X(t) ∈ C}, then {Xt : t ≥ 0} is positive Harris recurrent.
Theorem B.0.15. The extended waiting list process {W (s,i)t : t ≥ 0} and {W
(s−,i)
t : t ≥ 0}
are positive Harris recurrent.
Proof. Define Dirac measure ψ on the state space (W0,B(W0)) of both {W (s,i)t : t ≥ 0}
and {W (s−,i)t : t ≥ 0}, such that for ∀A ∈ B(W0), ψ(A) = I(w0 ∈ A), where w0 is the
empty state of the waiting list. It is obvious that ψ defined above is a finite measure, and
ψ(A) > 0 ⇔ w0 ∈ A. For both of the extended waiting list processes, if the process starts
at w ∈W0, ψ(A) > 0 indicates τA ≤ τw0 .
To show positive Harris recurrence, first note that it is shown in (3.1.2) that ∀w ∈W0,
Ew(τw0) <∞. (B.7)
Next we show that {w0} is a small set. Let ν be the Dirac measure on (W0,B(W0)) such
that ν(A) = I(w0 ∈ A). Suppose there does not exist any t > 0 and δ > 0 such that
P t(w0, A) ≥ δν(A),
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then for any A ∈ B(W0), we must have P t(w0, A) = 0 for all t > 0, which indicates
Pw0(τA) = ∞, a.s.. However this conflicts with the result Ew(τw0) < ∞ for all w ∈ W0
which is proved earlier.
Finally we show that the sufficient condition for positive Harris recurrence (B.6) is sat-
isfied. Note that with the small set C = {w0}, supx∈C Ex[τC(δ)] <∞ is equivalent to
Ew0 [τ{w0}(δ)] <∞,




t . For any fixed
δ > 0, by the Markov property,





Since we have shown Ew(τw0) < ∞ for all w ∈ W0, Ew0 [τ{w0}(δ)] must also be finite, and
hence the positive Harris recurrence for both extended waiting list processes.
A natural corollary is the following result:
Proposition B.0.16. There exists a finite invariant measure for each of the extended wait-
ing list processes {W (s,i)t : t ≥ 0} and {W
(s−,i)
t : t ≥ 0}.
Positive Harris recurrent processes have the following ergodicity property:
Proposition B.0.17. (Ergodic Theorem)
For any positive Harris recurrent process {Wt, t ≥ 0} on (W,B(W )), let π be the finite













Pw−a.s. for any w ∈W .
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Proof. See, e.g., Dai [1995], Meyn and Tweedie [2009] and Kaspi and Mandelbaum [1994]
Note that the above ergodic theorem connects the time average of a measurable function
of the process with its average under the invariant measure. This result is crucial in proving
the existence of the average occupancy of state i ∈ X at waiting time s ∈ [0, T ) as the
calendar time goes to infinity. To proceed with the proof, we first define the following
counting process and at-risk indicators:
We use the same notation for the counting processes and at-risk indicators defined in
the previous section. As a reminder:
Definition B.0.18. (Counting Processes and At-risk Indicators)




ij (s) := I(X̃
(k)(s−) = i, X̃(k)(s) = j),




ij (u) is the number of actual transitions from state i to j in
(s, t]. Similarly, define the càdlàg counting process for counterfactual transitions
dN
(k)
ij (s) := I(X
(k)(s−) = i,X(k)(s) = j)





Also define at-risk indicators for the kth patient’s actual transitions:
Ỹ
(k)





i (s−) := I(X̃
(k)(s−) = i),
and for counterfactual transitions,
Y
(k)





i (s−) := I(X
(k)(s−) = i),
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for i, j ∈ X0 and s, t ∈ [0, T ).
Next we represent the average occupancy of a state at a waiting time in the form of a
time average of a measurable of the extended waiting list processes, therefore the limit exists
as a result of the ergodic theorem.
Theorem B.0.19. (Existence and Definition of πi(s) and πi(s−))
For any i ∈ X and s ∈ [0, T ), let N[0,t] denote number of patient arrivals in calendar





















Moreover, πi(s), πi(s−) ∈ [0, 1].





























u )du = π
(s−,i)(fs,i)
exists Pw−a.s. for any initial state w ∈W0.
Since for W (s,i)t , kj,2 is the indicator component I(t − Tk ≥ s, X̃(k)(s) = i), while for
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W
(s−,i)




















i (s−) · (t− Tk − s) · I(t− Tk ∈ [s, T )).























































Pw−a.s. for any w ∈W0.




i (s)/N[0,t] ∈ [0, 1], we have πi(s) ∈ [0, 1]. The same conclusion









d·e Ceiling of a number
1n Vector of length n with all elements being 1
I(·) Indicator function
{·}i The ith element of the vector
I Identity matrix
ei Vector with the ith element being 1 and all other elements being 0
τ Intensity of Patient Arrivals
ρ Intensity of Organ Arrivals
Tk Time of arrival of the kth patient
Sj Time of arrival of the jth organ
NI Number of patient arrivals in calendar time interval I
OI Number of organ arrivals in calendar time interval I
X {0, 1, ..., n}, state space of patients’ health states, in which 0 denotes
death
X(s) Generic counterfactual transitions
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X(k)(s) The kth patient’s counterfactual transitions
R(s) Generic counterfactual post-transplant residual life if transplanted
at s
R(k)(s) The kth patient’s counterfactual post-transplant residual life if
transplanted at s
µs µi(s) = E (R(s) | X(s) = i), expected post-transplantation residual
life given state i at time of transplantation s
R̃(k)(s) R(k)(s)−
(
inft≥0{X(k)(t) = 0}− s
)
, gain in residual life from trans-
plantation
µ̃s µ̃i(s) := E(R̃
(k)(s) | X(k)(s) = i), expected gain in residual life
T Upper bound of a patient’s waiting time
p pi = P (X(0) = i) distribution of patients’ initial states upon arrival
qij(s) Infinitesimal generator of the counterfactual transitions
Q Qij(·) =
´
· qij(s) ds, measure matrix for counterfactual transitions
J = {J1, J2, . . . } Allocation sequence of indices of transplanted patients
T
(k)
T Time waited until transplantation for the kth patient
(n+ 1) Post-transplantation state
X0 X ∪ {n+ 1}, augmented patient state space

















(k)(s) = i), at-risk indicators of counterfactual transitions
Ft σ
(




Tk, Si, {X(k)(s) : s ∈ [0, t− Tk]} : Tk, Si ∈ [0, t]
)
∨ σ(Ji : Si < t)
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F̃t Natural filtration induced by the waiting list and arrivals of patients
and organs
It Index set of patients arrived before (including) t and are alive and
have not been transplanted at t
Wt Waiting list at calendar time t
w0 Empty state of the waiting list
W ∪∞d=1([0, T ]×X )d ∪ {w0}, state space of the waiting list
B(W ) Borel σ-algebra of W
W ′t Waiting list right before potential allocation at t
Mi Time of the ith recurrence to the empty state of the waiting list




i (s)/N[0,t], patients’ limiting average oc-
cupancy
Ψ dΨs = πs−dQs − dπs, limiting transplantation rate
Λ dΛi(s) = dΨi(s)/πi(s−) if πi(s−) 6= 0 and Λi({s}) =
dΨi(s)/{πs−dQs}i if otherwise
C Admissible control set of transplantation rates
c Penalty associated with the constraint
´
[0,T ] dΨs · 1n ≤ ρ/τ
Ψc,Λc Optimal transplantation rate under penalty c
Sc {(i, s) : i ∈ X , s ∈ [0, T ],Λci (s) > 0}, allocable set under penalty c
P The product integral
Bt Counterfactual transition matrix from epoch t to t + 1 in discrete
time
Swl Discrete state variable corresponding to expected in-waiting-list sur-
vival
Sµ Discrete state variable corresponding to expected post-transplant
survival
